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duties as the Administrator may request."
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This report is respectfully dedicated to our
colleague, Walter C. Williams, who passed away
on October 7, 1995. Dr. Williams was a pioneer
in both aviation and space. His dedicated service
to NASA and the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel as well as his numerous technical
accomplishments are legendary. We will miss his
knowledge, experience and calming influence.
Most of all, we will miss a friend whose advice
was always insightful and constantly sought. His
legacy is enormous, and we are proud to have
been among its recipients.

National Aeronautic and
Space Administration
Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-001
Reply to Attn of: Q-1 February 1996
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is pleased to submit its annual report covering the
period from February through December 1995. This was an extremely active and
significant period for NASA and hence for the Panel. The restructuring of NASA and the
planned consolidation of Space Shuttle operations under a Space Flight Operations
Contractor (SFOC) have the potential to increase efficiency. However, they also represent
substantial change and, as such, have the potential to increase risk. The Panel is confident
that your strong advocacy of safety above schedule and cost will go a long way towards
controlling any such increase. Restructuring the Space Shuttle Program can be
accomplished while maintaining safe operations, provided it is approached cautiously and
based on the extensive lessons learned from past safe Space Shuttle operations.
The Panel's frequent visits to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have indicated that the
commitment of Space Shuttle personnel to "Safety First" appears intact. This attitude
prevails throughout all KSC personnel, both contractor and NASA. There are indications
that distractions are up and morale may be suffering, but the professionalism of the
employees and their loyalty to the Space Shuttle Program should help ensure continued
safe operations.
The Panel has created three task teams to evaluate and advise NASA before, during, and
after the restructuring process. One team is reviewing the operations at KSC and taking the
"pulse" of the work force. The second team is assessing the potential safety impacts
of NASA restructuring and the transition to the SFOC. The third team is looking at the
capability of the Space Shuttle to support the manifest required to assemble and ultimately
operate the International Space Station.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel appreciates the extensive cooperation and assistance
received from NASA and contractor personnel throughout the past year. NASA's timely
response to Section II, "Findings and Recommendations" will greatly expedite the process
of evaluation and advice.
Very truly yours,
Paul M. Johnstone
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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I. INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP) has traditionally attempted to can-
vas the full range of NASA's human space-
flight and aeronautics programs during each
year's activities. Particular emphasis is then
placed on those activities which are viewed
as having the greatest potential for safety
problems. The past year was no exception.
For example, the Panel monitored Space
Shuttle launch activities and was gratified by
the successful missions. These included
three visits to and two dockings with the
Russian Mir Space Station which were
accomplished with only minor anomalies.
NASA's accomplishments were even more
impressive in light of the organizational
changes which were underway for much of
the year.
In addition to the Panel's normal oversight
activities, several special investigations were
conducted including one on the Phase II
Space Shuttle Main Engine Turbopumps and
another on the state of morale at the Kennedy
Space Center. Reports on these activities were
delivered to the Administrator and are not
included as part of this Annual Report. The
Panel also provided direct feedback to NASA
Centers and contractors.
The Panel is addressing the potential for
safety problems due to organizational
changes by increasing its scrutiny of Space
Shuttle operations and planning. Three spe-
cial task teams have been formed to examine
operations, transition plans and the pressures
imposed by the International Space Station
(ISS) flight manifest. These teams will
intensify their efforts in the coming year.
The past year was also one of transition for
the Panel. We mourn the passing of Dr.
Walter C. Williams who was a consultant to
the Panel. Paul M. Johnstone succeeded
Norman R. Parmet as chairman, and Richard
D. Blomberg replaced Mr. Johnstone as
deputy chairman. John A. Gotham resigned
as a Panel consultant, and Kenneth G.
Englar and Captain Dennis E. Fitch were
appointed as consultants. Mr. Melvin Stone
retired as a Panel member and became a
consultant to the ASAP. Dr. Seymour C.
Himmel, formerly a consultant, became a
member.
The balance of this report presents "Findings
and Recommendations" (Section II),
"Information in Support of Findings and
Recommendations" (Section III) and
Appendices (Section IV) describing Panel
membership, the NASA response to the
March 1995 ASAP report and a chronology
of the Panel's activities during the reporting
period.
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II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
OPERATIONS
Finding #1
Cutbacks in government and contractor per-
sonnel and other resources at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) and the planned transi-
tion of tasks from government to contractor
workers will create a new mode of Space
Shuttle operations. Those involved in day-to-
day Shuttle operations and management are in
the best position to determine how to maintain
the stated program priorities--fly safely, meet
the manifest and reduce costs, in that order.
Recommendation #1
Additional reductions in staff and operations
functions should be accomplished cautiously
and with appropriate inputs from the KSC
NASA/contractor team itself.
Finding #2
Obsolescence of Space Shuttle components is
a serious operational problem with the poten-
tial to impact safety. Many original equipment
manufacturers are discontinuing support of
their components. NASA is, therefore, faced
with increasing logistics and supply problems.
Recommendation #2
NASA should support augmenting the cur-
rent comprehensive logistics and supply sys-
tem so that it is capable of meeting Space
Shuttle Program needs in spite of increasing
obsolescence.
Finding #3
The Return to Launch Site (RTLS) abort
maneuver is one of the highest risk off-nominal
Space Shuttle flight procedures. A Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) shutdown leading
to an intact abort is more likely than a cata-
strophic engine failure. Exposure of an ascend-
ing Space Shuttle to the risk of performing the
demanding RTLS maneuver might be signifi-
cantly minimized by operating the Block II
SSME at higher thrust levels at appropriate
times. Certification of alternative Space Shuttle
landing approaches for use during contingency
aborts and installation of Global Positioning
System (GPS) could also contribute to the mini-
mization of RTLS risk (see Finding #5).
Recommendation #3
NASA should pursue with vigor efforts to
minimize Space Shuttle exposure to the
RTLS maneuver through all available means.
Finding #4
The Range Safety System (RSS) destruct
charges have been removed from the liquid
hydrogen tank of the External Tank (ET). The
risk studies which supported this removal also
suggested that the RSS charges had to be
retained on the Liquid Oxygen (LOX) tank of
the ET. It is preferable to omit as much ordnance
as possible from flight vehicles to reduce the
possibility of inadvertent activation.
Recommendation #4
Studies supporting the need for the RSS destruct
system on the LOX tank should be updated in
light of the current state of knowledge, operating
experience and the introduction of the new
Super Lightweight Tank (SLWT) to determine if
it is now acceptable to remove the ordnance.
ORBITER
Finding #5
The Orbiter and its landing sites continue to be
configured with obsolescent terminal navigation
systems. The existing Tactical Air Control and
Navigation (TACAN) and Microwave Scanning
Beam Landing System (MSBLS) systems are
increasingly difficult to maintain, vulnerable and
expensive. Continued reliance upon them limits
landing options in the event of a contingency
7
abort. Replacement of TACAN and MSBLS
with now available precise positioning GPS in a
triple redundant configuration would ameliorate
and most likely solve these problems.
Recommendation #5
Accelerate the installation of a triple redundant
precise positioning service GPS in all Orbiters.
Finding #6
Orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS) oxidiz-
er thruster valve leaks are occurring with
increasing frequency. More recently, RCS fuel
thruster valve leaks have also been observed.
Because isolation of leaking thrusters can be
implemented by manifold shut off and thruster
redundancy is provided, leaking thrusters have
not been considered a serious safety hazard.
RCS leaks in the vicinity of rendezvous targets
such as Mir and the International Space Station
(ISS) could, indeed be a serious safety hazard.
Recommendation #6
Do what is necessary to eliminate the RCS
thruster valve leaks now and in the future.
Finding #7
The use of Alumina Enhanced-Thermal Barrier
(AETB) tiles with Toughened Uni-place
Fibrous Insulation (TUFI) coating on the
Orbiter has the potential to enhance safety and
reduce life cycle cost.
Recommendation #7
NASA should make a thorough study of the
potential use of the AETB/TUFI tiles in order
to determine if it is cost effective to qualify
the tiles for flight.
SPACE SHUTTLE
MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
Finding #8
The SSME has performed well in flight during
this year. While some launches were delayed
because of problems or anomalies discovered
during pre-launch inspections and checkout or
development engine test firings at the Stennis
Space Center (SSC), such issues were thorough-
ly and rapidly investigated and resolved.
Recommendation #8
Continue the practice of thorough and disci-
plined adherence to inspection and checkout
of engines prior to commitment to flight as
well as prompt and thorough resolution of any
anomalies discovered.
Finding #9
The Block II engine, in near-final configura-
tion, re-entered development testing in mid
October 1995. Testing of what had been
expected to be the final configuration was
begun later that month. The High Pressure
Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) was a principal
cause of the late restart of testing primarily
because of slips in obtaining some redesigned
turbopump components. The remaining time
to achieve the scheduled first flight of the
Block II configuration is very tight and
allows for little, if any, problem correction
during development and certification testing.
The improved ruggedness and reliability of
this version of the SSME is critical to the
assembly and operation of the ISS.
Recommendation #9
Do not let schedule pressure curtail the planned
development and certification program.
REUSABLE SOLID
ROCKET MOTOR (RSRM)
Finding #10
Post flight inspection of recovered RSRMs
from STS-71 and STS-70 identified gas
paths leading to primary O-ring heat erosion
in joint #3 of the RSRM nozzles. Heat ero-
sion in this joint could compromise Space
Shuttle mission safety. NASA stopped all
launches until the anomaly was resolved and
corrective repairs made.
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Recommendation #10
NASA should continue to investigate and
resolve all potential Space Shuttle flight safety
problems in this same forthright manner.
Finding #11
The schedule for firings of Flight Support
Motors (FSMs) for evaluating changes made
to the RSRM has been stretched out. Now,
accelerating obsolescence and new environ-
mental regulations have increased the need for
the data supplied by FSM firings.
Recommendation #11
Do not further stretch out FSM firings.
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
Finding #I2
The development of the Super Lightweight
Tank (SLWT) using Aluminum Lithium (AI-Li)
material entails several unresolved technical
issues. These include a low fracture toughness
ratio and problems in large scale joint welding.
There are also critical structural integrity tests
which are behind schedule. Resolution of these
issues could impact the delivery of the SLWT.
Recommendation #12
Satisfactory resolution of these issues must be
achieved prior to SLWT flight.
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B. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
SHUTTLE/MIR
Finding #13
STS-74 delivered a Russian built docking
module to Mir which will be used for multi-
ple Shuttle/Mir dockings prior to ISS assem-
bly. This docking module and one designed
for use on the ISS use Russian-manufactured
pyrotechnic bolts. These bolts cannot be cer-
tified to NASA standards because of the
absence of adequate information from the
manufacturer. They also do not meet the
NASA design requirement that pyro bolts be
hermetically sealed. The development of a
replacement American pyro bolt has been
put on hold because its design may violate
the proprietary rights of the original Russian
manufacturer.
Recommendation #13
Continue to pursue the options of having the
Russian manufacturer modify the existing
pyro bolt design to include a hermetic seal and
the possibility of using the American designed
pyro bolt as a substitute.
INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION
Finding #I4
Over the life of the ISS mission there is a risk of
some meteoroid or orbital debris penetration.
While there is an awareness of the need for mit-
igation of the potential for debris penetration of
habitable and critical modules, planning and
implementation of damage control and repair
methods is lagging.
Recommendation #14
Continue to work hard to reduce the risk of
penetration of inhabited modules by mete-
oroids or orbital debris. Implement damage
detection, localization and isolation or repair
measures to reduce the risk of life or mis-
sion threatening impacts.
Finding #15
The Caution and Warning (C&W) system
design for the ISS has not kept pace with
Station's level of development due to cost con-
straints among other reasons. As a result, the
ability to develop a maximally effective safety
system design which detects and localizes haz-
ards and provides the information needed for
damage control may be compromised.
Recommendation tt15
The C&W system should not be unnecessarily
constrained by other ISS design decisions or
cost limitations. It is a vital part of the total
safety environment of the ISS and deserves
more detailed and timely design emphasis.
Finding #I6
The decision by the ISS Program to use two
Soyuz vehicles for crew rescue during the
early years of deployment involves at least
two significant limitations. The first is the
exclusion of approximately 28% of the crew
population due to anthropometric con-
straints. A second and more tractable issue is
the acceptance by the Program of Russian
language placards on displays and controls.
Under pressure, rudimentary training in the
Russian language has the potential to break
down and increase the probability of errors.
Recommendation #16
There is little that can be done about the
inherent limitations of the Soyuz design such
as the crew size constraints until Soyuz is
modified or replaced with a fully capable res-
cue vehicle design. The inclusion of some
simple placards to provide English labeling
would seem warranted given the emergency
climate in which a rescue vehicle will be used.
Finding 1117
The use of Soyuz as the Crew Rescue Vehicle
(CRV) for the ISS provides only an interim
capability. Maximally effective crew rescue
capabilities can only be attained through
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the development and deployment of a special
purpose CRV.
Recommendation #17
A new, fully capable CRV should be devel-
oped and deployed as soon as possible.
Finding #18
There are important ISS data processing items
for which there are no written requirements.
For example, it appears that there is no formal
requirement that any specific portion of the
computational system, software included, be
operational at any stage of ISS assembly.
Recommendation #18
NASA should review ISS top level require-
ments, and their flow down, and add specific
requirements where necessary to assure the
correct, staged, assembly of the station and its
computer and software systems.
Finding #19
ISS computer system safety requirements,
both hardware and software, have not been
available in a timely manner to the product
development teams. This is a matter of con-
siderable concern. Also, the safety function
of the Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for
computer system development appears less
than totally effective.
Recommendation #I9
NASA should review its computer system
safety requirements and the integration of
safety personnel into its IPTs to ensure that
requirements are in place before they are
needed, and that safety activities are given
proper coverage.
Finding #20
While the ISS computer architecture has been
simplified considerably, there are still areas in
which problems exist. The planned lifetime of
the Station will almost certainly require
upgrades to various computer and avionics
components, but there are no current plans for
defining and managing upgrades.
Recommendation #20
NASA should have plans in place to test the
robustness of the ISS computer architecture to
ensure reserve memory and computing capac-
ity throughout the Station's lifetime and to
provide an upgrade path for critical computer
system components.
Finding #2I
Much of the testing for ISS software is based
upon the use of simulators for various compo-
nents. If the simulations are not correct, errors
in the flight software could go undetected.
The simulators are not subject to the same
level of Verification and Validation (V&V) as
the flight software. The V&V of the simula-
tors is "by use" which means that the principal
validation of the simulations occurs at the
same time that the simulations are being used
to perform V&V on the flight software.
Recommendation #21
NASA should employ methods for more
thoroughly verifying and validating the simu-
lation models used in V&V activities for ISS
flight software.
Finding #22
It is not at all apparent that there are ade-
quate and consistent controls on the software
development tools that are in use for creating
ISS software. For example, software being
developed for Multiplexer/Demultiplexers
(MDMs) will be written in Ada and compiled
using a certified compiler while software for
other device controllers may be written in a
variety of languages and compiled with even
an uncertified compiler. Also a commercial
code generator is being used beyond its
intended domain.
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Recommendation #22
NASA should immediately review "allof its soft-
ware development processes and tools to ensure a
consistent and adequate level of certification.
Finding #23
Initial ISS activities on Independent Verification
and Validation (IV&V) of software appear to be
following a logical and reasonable approach.
The approach of bringing up issues at the lowest
reasonable level and escalating up the chain of
command as necessary is well advised and has
been and should continue to be effective.
Recommendation #23
NASA should build upon the good start that
has been made in the ISS IV&V effort.
Finding #24
The reduction in full around-the-clock support
from the Mission Control Center, the likeli-
hood of unanticipated safety situations to
which the crew must respond and the extend-
ed mission durations suggest that the ISS
strategy of deploying comprehensive on orbit
training resources using both Computer Based
Training (CBT) and Virtual Reality (VR) tech-
niques is appropriate.
Recommendation #24
The ISS should continue its excellent strategy
of using both CBT and VR training on orbit. In
addition, an effective on-call system to ensure
the rapid response of mission support personnel
on the ground should be developed.
Finding #25
The currently proposed method for deorbit-
ing/decommissioning the ISS at the end of its
useful life entails a controlled, targeted reen-
try with surviving debris falling into a remote
ocean area. The analysis and planning are
based on having a fully assembled station and
do not take into account deorbiting any of the
possible configurations prior to completion.
Recommendation #25
NASA should develop plans for deorbit/
decommission of intermediate ISS assembly
configurations.
Finding #26
Current ISS plans include extensive Extravehicular
Activity (EVA). As a result, NASA has planned
an improvement program for the existing
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) or space suit.
Recommendation #26
Continue to support the EMU improvement
program to ensure that the EMU can meet the
increased EVA requirements.
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C. AERONAUTICS
Finding #27
The Congress has drafted legislation directing the
privatization of the NASA microgravity research
aircraft. No in-depth study has been completed on
the safety ramifications of the transfer of the
Johnson Space Center (JSC) KC-135 or Lewis
Research Center (LeRC) DC-9 microgravity air-
craft to commerciM operation.
Recommendation #27
For reasons of safety, do not transfer any
NASA microgravity research aircraft opera-
tions to a commercial provider until ongoing
studies can assess the attendant safety issues.
If economic or other reasons dictate that the
aircraft must be transferred and time does not
permit waiting for study results, then micro-
gravity aircraft operations should be suspend-
ed until they can be certified safe under the
aegis of the new operators.
Finding #28
Langley Research Center has commenced a
joint Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)/
NASA program to amass data which can be
used to formulate operational procedures for
avoiding or minimizing the effects of flying
into aircraft-generated wake vortices. This
program has begun to shed light on an impor-
tant area of flight dynamics suspected of hav-
ing contributed to aircraft mishaps.
Recommendation #28
The wake vortex research program should be
strongly supported and, whenever meaning-
ful data are derived, these data should be
exported to the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), the FAA and the
entire spectrum of commercial, military and
general aviation.
Finding #29
The Dryden Flight Research Center's Basic
Operations Manual (BOM) describes a pro-
active attitude toward safety which is exem-
plary and worthy of emulation throughout
NASA.
Recommendation//29
Other Centers and NASA contractors could
profit from the use of the Dryden BOM as
a model.
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D. OTHER
Finding #30
NASA researchers have examined the impact of
fatigue and circadian disruption on pilots and
shift workers and developed a Fatigue
Countermeasures Program. Material developed
by the Fatigue Countermeasures Program is
now in widespread use at airlines and else-
where. Tens of thousands have received training
and guidance on effective ways to manage
fatigue through symptom identification and
scheduling/behavioral, physiological, pharma-
cological, and technological countermeasures.
Recommendation #30
Methods for fatigue identification and materi-
al on effective fatigue countermeasures should
be incorporated in training including that for
astronauts, flight crews, ground crews and
mission controllers. These groups are often
forced to vary their work hours and could
therefore benefit from the information now
widely being used throughout the transporta-
tion industry.
Finding #31
The Senior Managers'Safety Course conceived
and conducted by JSC is an outstanding
overview of philosophies, techniques and atti-
tudes essential to a successful safety program.
Recommendation #31
A safety course for senior managers similar to
the one conducted at JSC should be established
at other NASA centers and Headquarters.
Consideration should also be given to exporting
the course to major NASA contractors and
including its elements in managerial training
programs.
Finding #32
NASA's ongoing reorganization and the inten-
tion to pass responsibility for Space Shuttle
operations to a single Space Flight Operations
Contractor (SFOC) have potential safety
implications. To this point, other than an
effect on morale at the KSC due to uncertain-
ty, no significant problems have surfaced.
Recommendation #32
NASA leadership and top management should
continue active and detailed involvement in
the safety aspects of planning for and over-
sight of the NASA reorganization in general
and Space Shuttle operations in particular.
Finding #33
The plan for Space Shuttle restructuring and
downsizing provides that NASA personnel will
be involved in the resolution of any off-nominal
events which are beyond the operating experi-
ence base or "out-of-family." This places
extreme importance on the development and
implementation of the definition of an out-of-
family situation.
Recommendation #33
NASA personnel with direct Space Shuttle
operations experience should be involved not
only in the derivation of the definition of out-
of-family but also in the day-to-day decisions
on what constitutes an out-of-family event.
Finding #34
New propulsion control modes utilizing neural
nets are under development. The use of neural
nets raises questions of how such control soft-
ware are to be verified and validated for flight
operations. There may be a technology/certifi-
cation mismatch at present.
Recommendation #34
The Ames Research Center in its capacity as
designated center of excellence for informa-
tion systems technology should undertake the
research and technology necessary to provide
NASA with appropriate V&V techniques for
neural net control software.
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Finding #35
While hardware typically gets adequate cover-
age from the Safety and Mission Assurance
organizations at the NASA Centers, there is
evidence that software does not.
Recommendation #35
The Headquarters Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance should examine the depth
of the software assurance process at each of
the Centers and promulgate NASA-wide stan-
dards for adequate coverage.
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III. INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
OPERATIONS
Ref: Finding #1
The work force at the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) performs by far the largest "touch labor"
on the Space Shuttle. As such, their perfor-
mance is a major determinant of the safety of
operation of the vehicle and its systems. In addi-
tion, many of the pre-launch and launch prepa-
rations involve hazardous operations such as the
handling of hypergols. Distractions which cause
less than a total focus on the work at hand can
result in significant industrial safety problems.
The announcements of plans for additional
cutbacks and a significant restructuring of
Space Shuttle launch responsibilities under a
single Space Flight Operations Contractor
(SFOC) have the potential to affect worker
morale at KSC. The resulting state of flux and
uncertainty in the Space Shuttle Program cre-
ates a climate in which safety might be com-
promised. Cutbacks which result in lost jobs
and uncertain futures, both for the Program
and individual workers have the potential to
undermine morale. Proposed fundamental
changes in the structure of the system can lead
to the inadvertent omission of vital process
steps. It is impossible to define clearly at what
point the Program will cross over from safe to
unsafe conditions, but this crossover would
surely occur if reductions are allowed to pro-
ceed uncontrolled.
In spite of the negative potentials, assess-
ments by a special team from the Panel sug-
gest that the commitment of Space Shuttle
personnel to safety above all else remains
intact. This holds for management and work-
ers and for both contractor and NASA per-
sonnel. To be sure, morale is down and dis-
tractions are up, but as long as the existence
of the Space Shuttle Program is assured, pro-
fessionalism should prevail with resulting
safe operations. It seems abundantly clear
that schedules may be sacrificed, but safety
will not knowingly be compromised.
With respect to the proposed transition plans,
there is no inherent reason why any reasonable
Space Shuttle structure cannot be consistent
with safe operations. Restructuring the Space
Shuttle Program can be accomplished while
maintaining safe operations, provided it is
approached cautiously and based on the exten-
sive lessons learned from past safe Space
Shuttle operations. The Space Shuttle systems
and organization must therefore be changed
with care and with a complete awareness that
what might work for a totally new organization
may not be fully applicable to the overhaul of
one which has been operating successfully for
so long.
There are several principles which the Panel
believes must be followed in any Space
Shuttle Program transition process:
First, the team approach to Space Shuttle
decision-making involving both NASA and
contractor experts should be maintained. It
has functioned effectively and provides the
checks and balances which are essential to
the operation of such a complex enterprise.
Second, additional reductions in staff and
operating functions must be made
judiciously by the team itself based on
definitive statements of operating objectives
and funding guidance from Congress and
NASA management. Those involved in
day-to-day Space Shuttle operations and
management are in the best position to
determine how to take cuts without unduly
impacting safety.
Third, organizational change must be
gradual and also managed by the team.
Adequate time must be allocated for
analyzing the effects of changes as they are
made and permitting the system to reach
new equilibrium points. This will ensure
that vital safety systems are retained or
replaced by suitable substitutes.
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In short, the Space Shuttle Program appears
to be properly managing risk. Hardware
upgrades already in work, such as the Block
II main engines, will provide even greater
safety enhancements. The Program has suc-
cessfully shed significant costs and can likely
reduce expenditures even more without mate-
rially increasing risk as long as change is
properly managed, given ample time and
guided by those with first hand knowledge of
Program operations.
Ref: Finding #2
The realities of supporting the Space Shuttle
today are dominated by issues related to obso-
lescence. These issues can be divided into
three broad categories:
Obsolescence due to life limits or wear out
of components and, in some cases,
functional systems. This includes industry's
abandonment of systems which were
state-of-the-art in 1970 when they were
adopted for the Space Shuttle.
Obsolescence due to stringent new
environmental requirements, especially with
regard to repair and overhaul processes. The
disposal and control of hazardous waste
also impose a new dimension upon the
support tasks.
Obsolescence due to the inability to support
component overhaul and repair because
vendors have gone out of business or cannot
support the Space Shuttle, for example, due
to loss of skills and specific experience or
unavailability of special parts.
Examples of current difficulties include a num-
ber of important avionics components (e.g.,
master event controller, signal processing
assembly, several tape recorders) and airframe
components, (e.g., CO2 sensors, HfrI20 separa-
tors, water spray boilers, ammonia boilers).
Major items such as the Auxiliary Power Units
(APUs) are struggling from crisis to crisis in
many cases due to subcomponent problems, and
the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pod
problems are continuing.
Tracking and control systems for the multiplici-
ty of logistics problems appear to be providing
adequate information, but coping with the
increasing obsolescence trends will inevitably
lead to a higher rate of cannibalization or to
"workarounds" which might impair safety.
Better visibility into the entire subject of obso-
lescence should be developed if NASA is to
avoid crises in the future.
Ref: Finding #3
Return to Launch Site (RTLS) requires an
unusual and demanding flight profile fraught
with the potential for error in a high stress abort
situation. Should there be a shutdown of a main
engine during the early part of the ascent, the
RTLS procedure requires that the Space Shuttle
continues powered flight after separation of the
solid rocket boosters to expend propellants and
then jettison the External Tank (ET). After solid
rocket booster jettison, a powered pitch around
must be performed so that the orbiter is literally
flying backwards so that the thrust of the
remaining Space Shuttle Main Engines
(SSMEs) can supply a braking force. This is
followed by a powered pitch down, a pullout
and entry into the landing maneuver. All of this
adds up to extremely complex flight dynamics
including the need to fly through the SSME
plume and its associated turbulence, heat and
other off nominal flight dynamics. Remedies
might include the following:
Demonstration of operation of the SSME
Block II at settings greater than 109% for
use during an intact or contingency abort.
Investigation of the thermal and structural
loads to which the Space Shuttle would be
subjected at higher power settings.
• Installation of a certified three string Global
Positioning System (GPS) capability.
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Investigation of changes in planned landing
trajectories including so called stretched
entries.
While the above actions all contribute to the
safety of the Space Shuttle during ascent by
minimizing exposure to the necessity for
RTLS, each one by itself also contributes to
the enhancement of safety in other Space
Shuttle flight regimes. NASA's response to the
Panel's recommendation on the same subject
last year stated that an SSME certification at
higher power settings was underway. This
year's investigation did not reveal a coordinat-
ed program to minimize RTLS exposure.
Ref: Finding #4
The original design of the Space Shuttle includ-
ed Range Safety System (RSS) destruct charges
on both the Liquid Oxygen (LOX) and Liquid
Hydrogen (LH_) tanks of the ET. These were to
be used in the event of an accident to ensure the
complete destruction of the tank elements
before impact and therefore protect the safety of
people and property on the ground.
There is some added risk to the crew associated
with flying with destruct ordnance on the vehi-
cle. The crew would therefore prefer to reduce
their exposure to risk by eliminating the RSS
charges. Some time ago, NASA commissioned
studies by the Naval Surface Warfare Center
which provided data which led to the conclu-
sion that the risk to people on the ground (or
ships at sea) from the LOX tank was unaccept-
ably high in the event of certain aborts unless
the LOX tank was destroyed by ordnance.
These same studies were used to support the
removal of the destruct charges from the LH2
tank as analysis indicated it would break up
prior to impact even without a destruct charge.
Based on the Navy's studies, the Air Force
Eastern Test Range concluded that the charge
on the LOX tank could be ejected or safed after
first stage for low inclination launches. It was,
however, needed for high inclination launches
and during first stage. The Space Shuttle
Program chose to retain the charge rather than
increase system complexity with a charge that
could be disarmed or ejected in flight.
The Space Shuttle has now amassed signifi-
cant additional operating experience. The
assumptions used in the original Naval
Surface Warfare Center studies may, therefore,
no longer be totally operative. The situation at
present may favor removing the charges from
the LOX tank to reduce risk to the crew. At
very least, given the concern of the Astronaut
Office and some senior NASA engineers, it
would seem wise to revisit the underlying
studies and their assumptions to determine if
they are still valid in the current operating
environment. Intermediate possibilities such
as a software patch or other Safe and Arm
mechanism to disable the RSS system and
protect it from stray radio signals after first
stage should also be considered.
ORBITER
Ref: Finding #5
While a decision has in fact been made to
equip Orbiters with GPS, and a stretched out
program of single string installation and test-
ing is in place, the current plan will not com-
plete a three string system in even one vehi-
cle until the year 2000. Reasons for delay
include money availability and a perceived
need to await an Orbiter Maintenance Down
Period (OMDP) for installation of certain
wiring and antennas.
With a fully redundant precise positioning ser-
vice GPS in operation (a capability now guar-
anteed by way of a NASA/DOD memoran-
dum of understanding), landing the Orbiter
only at sites where TACAN and MSBLS are
maintained would no longer be a constraint.
With GPS any airfield with adequate runway
length anywhere within the Space Shuttle
footprint would be a potential landing site.
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An additional and important reason to acceler-
ate GPS installation centers on the fact that
MSBLS is suffering from an inability to be
repaired at the Shop Replaceable Unit (SRU)
level. While SRUs can still be purchased, this
is becoming increasingly difficult. Also, it was
recently learned by the Panel that Orbiter
TACANs are made by two different compa-
nies thus even further complicating logistics
and, potentially, system reliability.
Ref: Finding #6
Orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS) oxidizer
thruster valve leaks are occurring with increas-
ing frequency. Most recently, RCS fuel thruster
valve leaks have also been observed. Because
isolation of leaking thrusters can be implement-
ed by manifold shut off and thruster redundancy
is provided, leaking thrusters have not been con-
sidered a serious safety problem. RCS leaks in
the vicinity of rendezvous targets such as Mir
and the International Space Station (ISS) could,
indeed be a serious safety hazard.
The principal cause of leaking thrusters is iron
nitrates that accumulate on the valve seats
and/or poppets of the main and pilot stages of
the oxidizer valve. The current pilot-operated
valve is particularly susceptible to this nitrate
contamination. In spite of actions to upgrade
maintenance and handling procedures for the
RCS thrusters, leakage persists. Given the
increasing importance that the RCS thrusters
will play in future missions, NASA should do
whatever is necessary to eliminate the RCS
thruster valve leaks now and in the future.
Ref: Finding #7
The Alumina Enhanced-Thermal Barrier
(AETB) tiles with Toughened Uni-place
Fibrous Insulation (TUFI) coating have higher
temperature capability, improved durability
and dimensional stability and can be manufac-
tured in various densities from 8 to 22 lbs/ftL
The TUFI coating which is impregnated into the
tile surfaces provides improved impact resis-
tance and greater durability. It also reduces han-
dling damage, maintenance, cost and repair
time. The evaluation of TUFI on existing tiles
began in 1994 with flight demonstrations on
OV-102 and OV-103. There are a large number
of current tiles on the Orbiter that if replaced
with AETB/TUFI at 8 lbs/W might save inert
weight in the Orbiter.
While AETB/TUFI tiles have the potential to
increase capability substantially and save
weight at the same time, they are not qualified
for use on the Orbiter. NASA should plan to
qualify the AETB/TUFI tiles for flight making
maximum use of the data base from the qualifi-
cation of the current tiles.
SPACE SHUTTLE
MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
Ref: Finding #8
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has
performed well in flight this year. There have
been, however, a number of instances where
anomalies found during pre-flight checkout or
in development tests at the Stennis Space Center
(SSC) have caused launch delays while the
causes were determined and corrective action or
additional inspections were implemented.
For example, on STS-73, which had been
scheduled to fly three Block I engines, one of
the engines had to be removed because it could
not be verified while the engine was installed on
the Orbiter that an internal seal on its High
Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) had
been installed properly on that particular
engine. The potential for such a mis-installation
was discovered in the factory and an additional
inspection had been added to the manufacturing
process to assure that the seal was installed cor-
rectly. Unfortunately, the pump on the engine in
question had been installed prior to the imple-
mentation of the new inspection which led to
the removal and replacement of the engine,
delaying the launch.
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Another incident occurred on an engine in a test
stand at SSC in the process of starting a devel-
opment test firing. A leak occurred in the high-
pressure discharge duct from a HPOTR and the
test firing was aborted. A failure investigation
found that there was a rather large crack in the
duct at the site of a weld. It was revealed that
when the weld bead had been ground down
("flushed") as part of the manufacturing
process, some of the parent material had been
removed making the wall section too thin. After
considerable operating time, high-cycle fatigue
set in and the crack and leak occurred. All
engines, including those installed on an Orbiter
ready to launch, were then subjected to ultra-
sonic inspection to verify adequate wall thick-
ness. This, of course, occasioned a launch delay.
The importance of the above is to note that the
program has continued its devotion to safety of
flight by insisting that all such occurrences are
investigated thoroughly and any corrective
action or special inspections are implemented
before commitment to flight. Such a disciplined
approach to problem resolution must continue.
Ref: Finding #9
The Block II engine comprising the Block I
configuration plus the Large Throat Main
Combustion Chamber (LTMCC) and the
Advanced Turbopump Program (ATP) High
Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) re-entered
development testing in near-final configura-
tion in mid-October, 1995 after authority to
re-start the activity was given in the spring.
The delay in starting the development and cer-
tification test program was caused by slips in
the schedules for producing modified HPFTP
components. Included among the redesigned
components were: the turbine vane assembly
change from 54 to 75 vanes (to provide cor-
rect turbine flow area as well as to de-tune the
flow perturbations from a dynamic mode of
the turbine blades) and changes to the second
stage turbine vanes (to eliminate cracking at
the junction of the leading edge of the vanes
with the back-up structure).
The first test of this configuration yielded excel-
lent results with turbine temperatures and other
performance parameters of the HPFFP equal to
or better than predicted. The Specific Impulse
(Isp) achieved in this test was better than the
specification indicating that the slight loss of I_p
experienced with the Block I engine had been
overcome. There was only slight blanching of
the LTMCC which can be corrected easily.
The penultimate configuration Block II engine
started testing subsequently. This configuration
contains an ATP HPFTP with all but one of the
planned design changes incorporated and the final
version of the LTMCC which includes the cast
manifolds. The one HPP-TP change not included is
a damper for the lift-off seal which may not be
needed if testing so indicates. Early test results of
this configuration revealed a number of problems
associated with mechanical details of the turbo-
pump. Fixes for these problems have been devised
but implementation will impact the schedule. It
was anticipated that the test program could be
resumed by early 1996. On the positive side, the
specific impulse deficit experienced on the Block I
configuration has been overcome and the LTMCC
is achieving better than specified performance.
At the time of this writing, the Block II engine
program was three to four months behind its
original schedule. This leaves very little room
for problem resolution during this activity if the
program is to meet the planned Block II first
flight in September 1997. The more robust and
reliable Block II engine is vital for the Space
Shuttle support of the assembly and operation
of the ISS and every effort must be made to
keep the development and certification of this
engine configuration on schedule.
REUSABLE SOLID
ROCKET MOTOR (RSRM)
Ref: Finding #10
Several past instances of gas paths leading to
soot on the primary O-ring in RSRM nozzle
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joint #3 were observed during post flight
inspections. These "out of family" instances
showed no evidence of heat eroding the nozzle
primary seal, nor was it considered a likely
occurrence by NASA or the RSRM contractor,
Thiokol. The "blow-by" was thought to be per-
mitted by compressed air pockets remaining in
the Room Temperature Vulcanizate (RTV) ther-
mal barrier installed during assembly of nozzle
joints #3 and #4. Such voids could provide an
easy pathway for exhaust gases to reach the
joint O-ring.
Tiny burn marks were found on the joint #3
O-rings in three of the four STS-71 and STS-70
RSRM nozzles prompting a renewed investiga-
tion of the anomalies. Mission managers put the
next Space Shuttle launch, STS-69, on hold
while the situation was reviewed. A special
industry/NASA committee was convened. The
in-depth investigations by this committee verified
that the hot gas paths which caused heat erosion
of the primary O-rings resulted from the RTV
backfill process employed during nozzle assem-
bly. A worst case thermal environment analysis
of a single hot gas path to the primary O-ring
demonstrated that there would be insufficient
energy to bum through the primary O-ring during
flight. Nevertheless, the committee recommend-
ed inspection and repair of the joints prior to
flight even on already assembled nozzles.
A repair procedure to remove and replace the
original RTV in nozzle joints #3 and #4 was
developed to eliminate all "tail" voids above the
joint inflection point thus reducing the potential
for providing a gas path to the primary O-ring
during RSRM operation. The repair procedure
was validated on two flight configured nozzles
at Thiokol's Utah plant and then used to repair
the STS-69 boosters on the launch pad and clear
them for flight. Post flight analysis of STS-69
SRM's found no gas paths to the primary
O-rings in any of the four repaired joints.
Subsequently, the remaining RSRM nozzles
awaiting flight were repaired and the assem-
bly process in the plant was modified to avoid
the problem. NASA should continue to inves-
tigate and resolve all potential Space Shuttle
flight safety problems in this same forthright
manner.
Ref: Finding #11
The firing of Flight Support Motors (FSMs)
has been stretched out from a one to a two
year interval. These firings are used to qualify
design changes and new materials which must
be introduced due to environmental regula-
tions and obsolescence. Accelerating obsoles-
cence and new environmental regulations have
increased the need for the data supplied by
FSM firings. Because of their importance in
ensuring the safety of the RSRM, the FSM
firings should not be stretched out any further.
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
Ref: Finding #12
There are a number of technical issues that
could affect the margins of safety of the Super
Lightweight Tank (SLWT). Normally the
design of a structure is based on well charac-
terized materials with statistically derived
design allowables from sufficient tests. The
Aluminum-Lithium (A1-Li) material for the
SLWT is not well characterized. Its properties
therefore are being validated by lot acceptance
and structural tests. Unresolved technical
issues include a low fracture toughness ratio
and problems in large scale joint welding.
The yield to ultimate stress of 2195 AI-Li
material is less than the original 2219 A1
material which results in reduced fracture
toughness characteristics. The fracture tough-
ness ratio is of concern because the AI-Li
material being received exhibits properties
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inferior to the design values used. It may be
necessary to perform special fracture tough-
ness material tests to simulate service. There
are still a number of material tests that must
be conducted to verify the suitability of the
A1-Li material. These include fracture
toughness ratio tests.
Remaining structural integrity tests which
must be performed include proof tests and a
test of the aft dome to ultimate to verify its
buckling strength. The Aluminum Lithium
Test Article (ALTA) will be used to demon-
strate the ultimate strength capability of the
structure. At present this test is behind sched-
ule and personnel are working overtime to
recover. Finally, there are protoflight tests that
will be performed on the L02 and LH2 tanks
which should ensure their suitability for flight.
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B. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
SHUTTLE/MIR
Ref: Finding #13
STS-74 delivered a Russian built docking
module to Mir which will be used for multiple
Shuttle/Mir dockings prior to ISS assembly.
This docking module and one designed for
use on the ISS use Russian-manufactured
pyrotechnic bolts. The Russian pyro bolts can-
not be certified for multiple flights because of
outgassing. Current sealing of the pyro bolts is
inadequate. In a vacuum, they outgas to the
extent that the explosive charge may be insuf-
ficient to sever the bolt. Outgassing may also
cause the explosive to become brittle, crack,
and inadvertently detonate due to electro-
static discharge or friction. Conversely, while
on the ground the explosive charge may soak
up enough water to cause it to dud (no fire).
The most desirable way forward is to use an
American pyro bolt with known characteris-
tics which can be certified. If this cannot be
achieved because of legal constraints, ade-
quate hermetic sealing of the Russian pyro
bolt is required.
INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION
Ref: Finding #14
The overall design philosophy for the ISS to
mitigate the effects of meteoroid/orbital debris
(M/OD) impacts has been formulated and is
being implemented throughout the program.
In essence, habitable and critical pressurized
modules will be protected by shielding against
penetrating impacts of particles of the order of
1 cm in diameter and smaller. These represent
the vast majority of M/OD objects found at
ISS operating altitudes. Objects of the order of
10 cm and larger are tracked and cataloged by
the US Space Surveillance Network. The plan
for this size range of object is to obtain warn-
ings from the Network of close approaches of
objects and, using an altitude reboost engine
burn, to maneuver the ISS out of a possible
collision path. The remaining objects, from
1 to 10 cm in size, are a very small population
and constitute the residual threat of penetra-
tion with no protection other than the statisti-
cally small chance of encounter.
Since the probability of penetration of some
habitable or critical module remains finite
(about 10-20% over a 10 year mission life),
further measures must be taken to limit and
control damage after it occurs. Identification of
such measures is presently underway, but
implementation is still in the early planning
stage. An integral part of such a scheme should
be identifying and providing instrumentation
for detecting and locating penetrations and
development of the means for isolating and
repairing damage. As of December 1995, there
are no plans for such instrumentation, nor is it
clear that there is a specific requirement for it
(see Finding #15).
The concern is that by the time damage control
procedures are worked out and supporting
instrumentation is identified, there will be insuf-
ficient time to incorporate them into the design,
thus leading to inadequate risk mitigation.
Ref." Finding #15
The Caution and Warning (C&W) system
design for the ISS will play an important role
in preserving the safety of the crew. At the
time of this writing, it appeared as though the
definition of the C&W was not consistent with
the level of maturity of some of the other ISS
systems. C&W design should not be an after-
thought. In order to include the maximum
extent of protection for the crew, it is impor-
tant to make the C&W design an integral part
of the ISS development.
To meet its objectives, a C&W system must
adequately address the functions of hazard
detection, hazard localization and crew notifi-
cation of both the nature and severity of the
event. If these objectives are achieved, a crew
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will have the maximum chance of surviving a
hazardous event, and their ability to control
damage will also be maximized. The ISS
requirements specify that its C&W system
must address threats from fire, toxic spills and
depressurization. These are the main hazards
facing the crew.
The present C&W design does not appear to
provide sufficient localization information and
incorporates suboptimal annunciation methods.
It appears as though significant needed capabili-
ty has been omitted due to cost constraints and
because of steadfast adherence to previously
accepted rules which can no longer be support-
ed in the present budget climate. The present
design does not even include scarring for the
later addition of increased capabilities.
The Personal Computer System (PCS) or
"laptop" which is part of the ISS design is an
example of a system which has some
enhanced capability for annunciation to the
crew. The problem is that the PCS as currently
specified does not meet the rigid reliability
specifications for dedicated computer gear.
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) are a particular
concern. These are temporary computer lock-
ups caused by radiation particle hits. The
computer must be re-booted before it can be
used again. The alternative to using the PCS
for localization information is to rely on a
fixed C&W panel on the wall of each module
which provides only minimal information to
the crew and requires them to translate some
distance to obtain it.
The current limitation of the PCS to only
Criticality 3 (crit 3) functions appears worthy
of reconsideration. It is apparently based on
logic such as: 1) off the shelf the PCS is sub-
ject to some SEUs and somewhat lower relia-
bility than a true "space hardened" piece of
hardware; 2) space hardened hardware is
expensive; 3) the money is not available; 4)
non-space hardened hardware can be used for
non-critical functions; 5) therefore, the PCS
will be relegated to crit 3. The potential falla-
cy in this argument is that it ignores crit 2 and
even crit 1 functions which are not being han-
dled anywhere else in the system. For exam-
ple, it might be preferable to use the PCS for
C&W localization functions, even with a rela-
tively high (but absolutely small) chance of
locking up due to SEUs, than not to have the
localization at all.
It would seem wise for the ISS Program to
explore again the tradeoff between using a
device such as the PCS which has a higher
risk of unreliability than has been traditionally
accepted and omitting the needed information
altogether. Given the relatively low chance of
a PCS failure and the almost certain ability to
detect the failure if it does occur, it might be
advisable to waive the stringent reliability
requirements and use the PCS to its full poten-
tial. If it were to fail, the system would merely
degrade to the currently planned and accepted
performance level.
The present ISS design also does not provide
for the localization of depressurization events.
In the absence of this information, the crew will
certainly be delayed in determining appropriate
countermeasures for their own safety and to
preserve the ISS in case of a depressurization.
Space Station Freedom had a plan for localizing
a depressurization event using airflow directions
and velocities. This may be difficult and/or
expensive to implement under the ISS architec-
ture, but it is certainly technically feasible.
Some level of localization of pressurization
information should be considered as part of the
ISS C&W design.
Ref: Findings #16 and #17
Soyuz has been specified as the initial Crew
Rescue Vehicle (CRV) for the ISS. It is obvi-
ous that Soyuz is the only CRV which can rea-
sonably be available for the first years of the
ISS mission. The use of Soyuz, however,
involves several limitations which should not
be minimized. The first is the exclusion of
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28% of the US astronaut population because
of anthropometric constraints. There is little
that can be done about this without modifying
or replacing Soyuz, but NASA should at least
acknowledge this as a consequence of its use.
Crew members exceeding the anthropometric
limits imposed by Soyuz will not be able to
remain on the ISS until Soyuz is replaced by a
new CRV.
A second and more tractable issue with the
use of Soyuz is the acceptance by the program
of Russian Language labeling on displays and
controls. It is not clear why some simple plac-
ards cannot be added to provide English label-
ing. This would certainly seem warranted
given the emergency climate in which a CRV
will be used. Under pressure, rudimentary
training in the Russian language has the
potential to break down and increase the prob-
ability of errors.
The Panel position presented last year must
also be reiterated: that use of the Soyuz as an
interim measure is only justifiable as an expe-
dient from the standpoint of safety. A new and
more capable crew rescue vehicle is definitely
needed to minimize risk over the operational
life of the ISS.
Ref: Finding #18
The principal mechanism that NASA and its
contractors use to ensure the completeness of
their designs is the traceability of require-
ments. All of the specific work items are
expected to trace back through a requirements
flow down. If a task cannot be traced through
a requirements flow, then there is no require-
ment that the task be accomplished. A concern
is that there are important items for which
there are no specified requirements. Curiously,
there is no formal requirement that the space
station be assembled or be operational after
each stage. Consequently, there are no
requirements concerning what portions of the
software must be operational at the comple-
tion of each stage. It appears that there is no
formal requirement that any specific portion
of the computational system, software includ-
ed, be operational at any stage.
The absence of detailed requirements makes it
difficult to organize software development in
such a way as to guarantee that the station
computer systems will be operable after each
assembly stage. For example, the top level
flight-by-flight computer requirements for ISS
assembly occur at the software requirements
specification level. The Guidance, Navigation
and Control (GNC) requirement for ISS is
above that level. Thus, there is no formal
requirement in the requirements flow down
that GNC functions be operable before
Assembly Complete. This is being handled in
an ad hoc manner at present. It appears to be
the case that the analysis and integration
teams (AIT's) are supposed to be looking for
things like this. However, this mechanism
seems rather loose, leading to concern that
something important may be overlooked.
NASA should therefore review ISS top level
requirements, and their flow down, and add
specific requirements where necessary to
assure the correct, staged, assembly of the sta-
tion and its computer and software systems.
Ref: Finding #19
There are several situations which indicate that
the safety process is not integrated into ISS
computer system development in an effective
and meaningful way. It was reported to the
Panel that computer safety requirements did not
flow down to the Integrated Product Teams
(IPTs) until September 1995. The lack of safety
requirements has been a matter of considerable
concern to the ISS computer development IPTs.
Nevertheless, while awaiting formal require-
ments the teams are working to what they
expected them to be in the hope that major
changes would not be necessary when the safe-
ty requirements were received.
Apparently, there is also not an effective inte-
gration of the safety function within the product
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teams. For example, at the time of this writing
no integrated schedule for software develop-
ment across the various assembly stages existed.
This may be an outgrowth of the general issue
of lack of requirements, not just formal safety
requirements, but functional requirements that
have safety implications. It would seem that
these situations are a result of tight schedules,
time pressures and limited budgets. While the
specific issue of safety requirements is presently
scheduled to be resolved by the time of publica-
tion of this report, it is the broader perspective
of the accumulation of many different unre-
solved issues that is of greatest concern. It
appears that computer system safety may not be
receiving the level of attention it deserves.
Overall, it is not clear that the processes needed
for the development of safe and functional com-
puter systems are in place.
Ref: Finding #20
The ISS computer architecture has been sim-
plified considerably from the early days of
Space Station Freedom, mostly for the better.
However, there are still areas for concern.
Perhaps these concerns are transient and may
be removed as development progresses.
Nevertheless, their existence at this late stage
of development is worrisome.
The backbone of the ISS computer system
architecture is a standard 1553 data bus. This
technology has been in use in the military for
more than a decade and is considered proven.
However, NASA is building the largest 1553
network ever constructed, and is finding seri-
ous problems, even when everything is "with-
in specs." For example, the simple operation
of inserting a new node on the network or
moving the physical location of a node by a
foot or two may be sufficient to make the net-
work fail. It is presumed that the specified net-
work will be made to function correctly. But,
how robust will it be? How will it behave on
orbit under varying conditions? How will it
function after it must be repaired on orbit?
There are also significant computer capacity
issues at present. In particular, some memories
are more than fully subscribed. Scrubs are tak-
ing place, and must be monitored carefully to
ensure that needed capability is not removed.
There are no plans for upgrading the proces-
sors. The specified processors employing
"386" technology are already near the end of
their lifetime and will be past the end by the
time the ISS is complete. Plans have been
made for upgrading memory and other com-
ponents but not the Central Processing Unit
(CPU) itself. Moreover, the use of a 16 bit bus
is a throwback to older technology.
Ref: Finding #21
The testing of ISS integrated software systems
is highly dependent upon the use of simula-
tion. This is essential since in some cases, it is
not possible to integrate everything on the
ground. The validation of the simulation mod-
els is critical to the success of the testing
process. The plan for ISS is to validate the
simulation models "by use." That is, each
model is validated by how well it appears to
perform when it is used in the validation of
ISS software during simulations. A safety
concern with this approach is how it can be
determined that the fidelity of the model is
adequate. Given the safety criticality of much
of the ISS software, NASA should employ
methods for more thoroughly verifying and
validating the simulation models used in
Verification and Validation (V & V) activities
for ISS flight software.
Ref: Finding #22
It is not at all apparent that there are adequate
controls on the software development systems
that are in use for creating ISS software. The
software developed for the Multiplexer/
Demultiplexers (MDMs) will be written in
Ada, and compiled using the Alysis compiler,
for which a certification process has been
used. This seems reasonable. However, there
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is a great deal of software that will be in
device controllers other than the MDMs. This
latter software may be written in the C lan-
guage and compiled with virtually any C com-
piler. There are no requirements for certifica-
tion of the C compilers used, nor even a
requirement that the same compiler be used
throughout.
One of the emerging techniques for develop-
ing large software systems is the use of
domain specific (e.g., control systems) code
generators. Matrix X is such a system that is
being widely used for ISS code development.
For its intended domain, this is fine. However,
Matrix X is being used extensively for appli-
cations beyond those for which it was
designed and for which it may produce ineffi-
cient, and certainly less well tested, code.
There is also considerable code from Space
Station Freedom that will be used. In the case
of this code, the testing and validation is being
"grandfathered" based upon previous testing.
This may not result in any problems since it
appears that the testing and validation for
Freedom were more rigorous than for ISS.
However, it was reported that the available test
records are sometimes incomplete.
The ISS software is not all being developed
by NASA and its contractors. The Russians
are developing the software for the service
module and will use a different processor. The
possibility of integrating one more type of
hardware and operating system presents a
potentially daunting technical challenge.
In view of the above, NASA should immedi-
ately review all of its ISS software develop-
ment processes and tools to ensure a consis-
tent and adequate level of certification and
adequate functional integration.
Ref: Finding #23
Initial ISS activities on Independent
Verification and Validation (IV&V) of soft-
ware appear to be following a logical and rea-
sonable approach. The IV&V contractor
seems to be well on board and establishing
relationships with the program so that they
can have access as the work proceeds. They
have decided not to attempt to bite off more
than they can chew and have developed what
appears to be an acceptable approach to the
job. Having half their work force at the
Johnson Space Center (JSC) is good and is
vital to their effectiveness. Their approach of
bringing up issues at the lowest reasonable
level and escalating up the chain of command
as necessary is well advised and should be
effective.
The initial IV&V work focused on a number
of programmatic issues and provided good
insights into some real program problems.
Once requirements are finalized, it is hoped
that IV&V efforts will turn to analyses of the
software itself.
Ref: Finding #24
The plans for the ISS involve extended mis-
sion durations. It will not be efficient or cost
effective to provide weekly 21 shift "full"
coverage at the Mission Control Center
(MCC). NASA should evaluate staffing
requirements shift-by-shift and arrange work
schedules accordingly. The development of a
plan for reduced staffing might profitably ben-
efit from examining the methods used by the
airlines in analogous situations.
In the event of a problem on the station, the
crew will have to respond based on its training
and the support it receives from technical
experts on the ground. It is likely that some of
the responses to off-normals will have to be
made during a reduced staffing shift in the
MCC. It is possible that the crew may have to
respond to something they were not trained
for or for which refresher training is needed.
Computer Based Training (CBT) and Virtual
Reality (VR) techniques will permit the crew
to prepare adequately for the necessary
3O
response in a timely and efficient manner
regardless of the level of immediate support
available from the ground. Advances in both
CBT and VR technologies have rendered
these approaches fully "operational" and well
within the resource constraints of the ISS. The
continued use and expansion of both CBT and
VR training techniques would therefore
appear appropriate.
Ref: Finding #25
The currently proposed method for deorbiting/
deconm-fissioning the ISS at the end of its useful
life entails a controlled, tmgeted reentry wifh sur-
viving debris lidling into a remote ocean area.
This requires that some sort of propulsive module
will be available very early in the assembly
sequence in order to have the capability for con-
trolled reentry. The technical feasibility of this
approach is covered in Draft Tier 2 Environmental
Impact Statement fi)r Intenlational Space Station
dated October 1995 and is based on having a fully
assembled ISS in orbit.
The assessment does not take into account any
potential cases where the station is less than
100% complete. Between the first element
launch in December 1997 and the fully assem-
bled ISS in 2002, there will be several signifi-
cantly different configurations. A controlled
reentry of some of these configurations might
be essentially the same as that of the complet-
ed ISS; however, there are likely to be other
situations where reentry characteristics will be
significantly different from those of the fully
assembled station.
Also, it is possible that the reentry of the
ISS, whether complete or incomplete, could
be inadvertent. The behavior of any ISS con-
figuration during an inadvertent reentry
would be expected to be similar to that of its
counterpart during a controlled deorbit
sequence except for the landing area. The
difference lies only in the indeterminate
location of the impact area/footprint under
the orbit flight path as opposed to the prede-
termined remote ocean location that would
be preferred for decommissioning. An inad-
vertent reentry could occur if: 1) there was
an inability to supply the propellant required
to maintain a safe orbit; 2) there was a dis-
abling collision with orbital debris, mete-
oroids or other objects; or 3) there were mul-
tiple major on-board failures. Therefore,
NASA should develop plans for
deorbit/decommission of intermediate ISS
assembly configurations with or without
control capability.
Ref: Finding #26
As plans for the ISS mature, it is clear that
extensive Extravehicular Activity (EVA) will
be required to assemble and maintain the
station. In order to support these EVAs, an
upgrade program for the Extravehicular
Mobility Unit (EMU) or space suit is need-
ed. NASA has identified the key components
of this program including extending the
number of uses between overhauls, permit-
ting some on-orbit sizing and improving the
gloves and the Portable Life Support
System. Given the importance of the EMU
for safe EVAs, NASA should continue to
support the EMU improvement program to
ensure that it can meet increased EVA
requirements.
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C. AERONAUTICS
Ref: Finding #27
The Congress has drafted legislative lan-
guage directing that NASA's microgravity
aircraft operations be privatized. There is
great concern among the Panel, the NASA
Intercenter Air Operations Panel and the
NASA microgravity aircraft operators over
safety should a new, inexperienced operator
enter upon the scene. Microgravity flying,
especially with large aircraft, requires precise
maneuvers close to the aircraft operational
and structural limits in specially configured
aircraft. It takes years of additional training
for pilots to gain the necessary skills and
experience to accomplish this safely. In any
case, any major change in operations as
demanding as microgravity flight could well
impact safety. Several NASA bodies are now
in the process of reviewing the safety impli-
cations of a shift from NASA to commercial
operation of the microgravity aircraft; it
makes great sense to await the outcome of
their studies before acting on any privatiza-
tion of microgravity aircraft.
Ref: Finding #28
The team from the Langley Research Center
and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) that produced widely applied research
results on wind shear has now begun a pro-
gram to study wake vortices. Like the wind
shear program, the wake vortex research is
designed to produce data from which opera-
tional procedures can be formulated to
increase safety and more efficient terminal
area operations. The first task of this effort has
been to define a method for predicting the dis-
persion and dissipation of an aircraft's trailing
vortex. This program has already begun to
shed light on an important area of flight
dynamics suspected of having contributed to
aircraft mishaps.
Because of the importance of wake vortex
research to aviation safety, the wake vortex
research program should be strongly support-
ed and, whenever meaningful data are derived,
those data should be exported to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the
FAA and the entire spectrum of commercial,
military and general aviation.
Ref: Finding #29
Safety at the Dryden Research Center begins
with the center director's personal and hands
on involvement, permeates through all levels
of government and contractor personnel and is
codified in an outstanding Basic Operations
Manual (BOM). Aside from the all important
participation of leadership, rapid exchange of
lessons learned, configuration control, design
reviews, thorough flight preparation and peri-
odic safety stand downs are only some of the
elements of the Dryden program covered in
the BOM. The X-31 accident investigation
was extremely well done and the lessons
learned therefrom immediately incorporated
in the BOM.
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D. OTHER
Ref: Finding #30
Fatigue and the disruption of the body's natural
circadian rhythms are problems encountered
when humans engage in shift work or rapidly
cross time zones. Commercial pilots and shift
workers are prone to the deleterious effects
which include reduced performance capabilities
and a resulting increase in mishap propensity.
Astronauts, ground crews and the personnel
who staff the Mission Control Center (MCC)
often follow schedules which leave them sus-
ceptible to fatigue effects.
Researchers from NASA's Ames Research
Center (ARC) and other sleep research centers
worldwide have examined the impact of fatigue
and circadian disruption on pilots and shift
workers. The NASA group at ARC has devel-
oped a Fatigue Countermeasures Program
which includes training and education modules
which can be included in existing training pro-
grams. For example, many of the major U.S.
and worldwide airlines are employing the
NASA materials and are teaching them with
their own instructors. Both flight and cabin
crews are benefitting from receipt of the best
current information on the causes of fatigue, its
identification on the job, its consequences and
its management.
A joint NASA, National Transportation Safety
Board symposium on Managing Fatigue in
Transportation was held on November 1-2,
1995, and attracted approximately 500 partici-
pants from multiple travel modes. There was
enthusiastic support for increasing awareness
of the problem and for adopting effective ways
to manage fatigue through symptom identifica-
tion and physiological, pharmacological,
scheduling/behavioral and technological coun-
termeasures. Additional research for an even
better understanding of the problem and its
remedies was also requested.
Given the proved benefits of the Fatigue
Countermeasures Program education and
training module and its widespread adoption
in transportation, it would seem appropriate
for the Space Shuttle and International Space
Station Programs to incorporate it in existing
training efforts. Astronauts, ground workers
and MCC personnel could all benefit from
better knowledge about the causes of fatigue
and its proper management. The available
materials are already designed to be adapted
into existing programs without significant dif-
ficulty. The ARC is also holding regular "train
the trainers" sessions to facilitate the adapta-
tion and use of the materials.
Ref: Finding #31
The JSC Senior Managers' Safety Course is a
two day immersion-based course which covers
safety, health and environmental considerations
for the senior manager. Many managers arrive
at managerial level positions without any sig-
nificant appreciation of what safety entails. A
course such as this ensures that all managers
understand the principles underlying a good
safety program and helps keep them in tune
with top management and its safety impera-
tives. This is especially important as NASA
downsizes, tries to do more with less and turns
to more contractor run operations. Therefore, a
safety course for senior managers similar to the
one conducted at JSC should be established at
other NASA centers and Headquarters.
Consideration should also be given to exporting
the course to major NASA contractors and
including it as part of both NASA and contrac-
tor managerial training.
Ref: Finding #32
NASA's ongoing reorganization and the inten-
tion to pass responsibility for Space Shuttle
operations to a single Space Flight Operations
Contractor (SFOC) have potential safety
implications. To this point, other than an
effect on morale at the KSC due to uncertain-
ty, no significant problems have surfaced.
NASA, and particularly, the Offices of Space
Flight and Safety and Mission Assurance,
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appear to have the Space Shuttle contracting
process well in hand with safety paramount at
every turn. Because of this and, possibly,
because the restructuring is still in early
stages, other than the aforementioned issue of
KSC morale, safety problems have been few
to non-existent. The cautious approach taken
thus far is commendable. Nevertheless, the
potential for safety problems remains. NASA
leadership and top management should there-
fore continue active and detailed involvement
in the safety aspects of planning for and over-
sight of NASA reorganization in general and
Space Shuttle operations in particular.
Ref: Finding #33
NASA has decided to restructure and down-
size its Space Shuttle operations. Many NASA
personnel now working on Space Shuttle
operations and sustaining engineering will be
relieved of those duties. A contractor will take
on an increased level of accountability and
responsibility for day-to-day Space Shuttle
operations. NASA will continue to have over-
all Space Shuttle responsibility and liability
and will still be responsible for safety, flight
manifest and the space flight operations bud-
get as well as for recruiting, selecting and
training crews.
As part of this plan, NASA personnel will
no longer be involved in dealing with non-
conformances of hardware, software and
configuration requirements which are "with-
in family." The concept is that if the task is
simply to return the system to its pre-
specified state from a condition which has
been successfully dealt with before, there is
no reason for NASA to become involved.
Theoretically, this is reasonable. A problem
arises, however, in arriving at a suitable
definition for determining if a condition is in
or out-of-family and in the use of that defini-
tion on a daily basis.
The extremes of operating experience present
little problem. For example, if a component or
system fails which has never failed before or a
serious mishap occurs, it is clearly out-of-fami-
ly. Conversely, if a wear item continues to wear
on every flight, that would represent an obvious
in family occurrence. The problem is with
many situations which fall between these
extremes. Perhaps a problem which has been
seen before is becoming more frequent or
severe (e.g., the nozzle O-rings or the solid
rocket booster pressure spikes) or one which
has not been noticed for many flights suddenly
starts to recur. For these types of situations, it
may be extremely difficult to arrive at a defini-
tion for out-of-family which is sufficiently
clear-cut. Moreover, the eventual definition of
out-of-family will likely carry with it so much
"overhead" that a contractor may have a strong
incentive not to classify something as out-of-
family whenever possible especially if the con-
tractor bears little or no liability for an incorrect
decision.
Given the importance of the definition of "out-
of-family," it would seem essential for NASA
personnel with direct Space Shuttle operations
experience to be involved in the process of
developing a definition. The derivation of the
criteria for out-of-family by itself, however, will
not be enough to guarantee appropriate checks
and balances involving consultation with
NASA. A process will have to be devised which
permits NASA personnel to monitor decision-
making on the status of non-conformance situa-
tions. Through this mechanism, NASA will be
able to ensure that it is a part of the decision
making in all situations which could potentially
involve loss of crew, vehicle or significant
financial resources or a major compromise to
the Space Shuttle launch schedule.
Finally, the proposed future role of NASA
causes a bit of a dilemma. NASA has said that
it will approve all dispositions for out-of-
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family non-conformance. With the proposed
reductions of NASA personnel in operational
roles, a question arises concerning what basis
those in the NASA oversight role will have for
making and enforcing these judgments.
Initially, people can be appointed who have
been involved in a "hands on" manner with
the Space Shuttle. Eventually, however,
NASA will run out of people with direct oper-
ational experience. At that point, the effective-
ness of the NASA inputs may be compro-
mised and safety could suffer.
Ref: Finding #34
New propulsion control modes utilizing neural
nets are under development at Dryden and
Ames. These allow aircraft to be reliably land-
ed under fault conditions that previously would
usually result in crashes. Neural nets are now
being introduced into the Propulsion
Controlled Aircraft (PCA) system. The use of
neural nets in flight control systems raises
questions of how this controller software can
be verified and validated for flight operations.
At present, they go through the standard
Dryden safety processes. The first neural net
experiments should not represent a Verification
and Validation issue because the neural net is
used on one of three redundant channels and
only for capturing data.
There is ongoing work to break the neural net
operation into regions each of which might be
more simply validated. Nevertheless, the opin-
ion has been expressed that there is a technolo-
gy/certification mismatch at present. There is a
feeling that new criteria are needed for certifi-
cation for advanced control software. The
Ames Research Center in its capacity as desig-
nated center of excellence for information sys-
tems technology should undertake the research
and technology necessary to provide NASA
with appropriate V&V techniques for neural
net control software.
Ref: Finding #35
There is at least one NASA Center which has
only one NASA software person in its Safety
and Mission Assurance (S&MA) office to han-
dle all of the software assurance issues. Even
when a few contractor personnel are added, this
is an inadequate staffing level to accomplish
much meaningful assurance work on software.
Moreover, the contractor personnel are not
allowed to work on a number of important soft-
ware evaluations because of possible propri-
etary conflicts. Projects seem to have devel-
oped the habit of budgeting for hardware safety
analyses with little or nothing allocated for
software safety. It does not seem that software
safety is taken seriously! By increasing impor-
tance of software in operating systems, there is
an obvious need for the S&MA organizations
to penetrate more broadly throughout the
Centers and provide a level of assurance com-
mensurate with the growing role of software.
Given the existence of at least one example of
an under staffed software assurance function,
the Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance should examine the depth of the
software assurance process at each of the
Centers and promulgate NASA-wide standards
for adequate coverage.
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APPENDIX B
NASA RESPONSE TO
MARCH 1995 ANNUAL REPORT
SUMMARY
NASA responded on July 14, 1995, to the "Findings and Recommendations" from the March
1995 Annual Report. NASA's response to each report item is categorized by the Panel as "open,
continuing, or closed." Open items are those on which the Panel differs with the NASA response
in one or more respects. They are typically addressed by a new finding and recommendation in
this report. Continuing items involve concerns that are an inherent part of NASA operations or
have not progressed sufficiently to permit a final determination by the Panel. These will remain a
focus of the Panel's activities during the next year. Items considered answered adequately are
deemed closed.
Based on the Panel's review of the NASA response and the information gathered during the
1995 period, the Panel considers that the following is the status of the recommendations made in
the 1995 report.
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RECOMMENDATION
NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS
I CONTINUING
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
International Space Station (ISS) Independent Safety
Assessment Function
ISS Assured Crew Return Capability
ISS Caution and Warning
ISS Fire Suppression Effectiveness
ISS Hazardous Materials and Procedures
ISS Orbital Debris Protection
Russian Androgynous Peripheral Docking System (APDS) Hook
Capture Indicator
APDS Backup Systems - Pyro Bolts
Additional Space Shuttle Payload Capability
New Gas Generator Valve Module
Advanced Orbiter Displays/System Working Group
Tactical Air Control & Navigation/Microwave Scanning Beam
Landing System Obsolescence
Data Processing Requirements Growth
Improve Autoland Equipment and Crew Flight Rules
and Training
Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) Inspection and
Assembly Processes
SSME Block II Modifications
SSME Health Monitoring
SSME Block II Safety hnprovement
Super Lightweight Tank Ultimate Loads Test
Solid Rocket Booster Structural Tests
Critical Components Cannibalization
Integrated Logistics Panel
KSC Logistics Consolidation Plan
TU-144 Design and Safety Assessment
Wind Shear Research
Tire Research Program
Propulsion Controlled Aircraft System
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Range Safety Policy
Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue
Priority of Software Issues
Independent Safety Oversight of Human Experiments
Aviation Safety Reporting System
Aircraft Operations Specialists Advisory Group
Total Quality Management
OPEN
OPEN
OPEN
CLOSED
OPEN
CLOSED
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
OPEN
CONTINUING
OPEN
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
OPEN
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
OPEN
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the AdmlnlltrMor
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr. Paul M. Johnstone
Chairman, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel
24181 Old House Cove Road
St. Michaels, MD 21663
Dear Mr. Johnstone:
In accordance with Mr. Norman R. Parmet's introductory
letter to the March 1995 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
Annual Report, enclosed is NASA's detailed response to Section
II, _Findings and Recommendations."
The ASAP's efforts in assisting NASA in maintaining the
highest possible safety standards are commendable. Your
recommendations are highly regarded and play an important role in
risk reduction in NASA programs.
We thank you and your Panel members for your valuable
contributions. ASAP recommendations receive the full attention
of NASA senior management. We look forward to working with you.
Sincerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
Enclosure
1995 AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL REPORT
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES
A. SPACE STATION PROGRAM
Finding #1:
The original organization of the International Space Station (ISS) Program included an indepen-
dent safety assessment function reporting directly to the Program Manager. Subsequently, this
was changed so that independent assessment reported directly to the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance.
Recommendation #1:
Maintain the true independence of the safety assessment function by ensuring that it reports out-
side the Space Station Program.
NASA Response to Recommendation #I:
NASA agrees. The International Space Station Independent Assessment Team (IAT) reports
directly to the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) at NASA Headquarters. At the
same time, the S&MA team within the Space Station program provides early and continuous
S&MA input to design and operations, allowing for efficient incorporation and implementation
of the requirements. This is in addition to maintaining a reporting path to the IAT.
Finding #2:
The ISS Program has committed to providing an assured crew return capability. This will initial-
ly be accomplished by using a combination of docked Space Shuttles and Soyuz capsules. Once
the ISS is permanently and fully staffed, a newly designed Assured Crew Return Vehicle
(ACRV) will be deployed.
Recommendation #2:
The use of the Space Shuttle and Soyuz as an interim measure [for assured crew return] is an
expedient. The planned new ACRV is definitely needed to support safety in the long term. The
design of this permanent ACRV, regardless of where and when it is built, should be consistent
with the design reference missions and systems requirements previously defined by the ACRV
Office of the Space Station Freedom.
NASA Response to Recommendation #2:
NASA agrees. The ACRV documentation presently in place in the Space Station program (SSP
41000A and 50011-01 Rev A) is consistent with the design reference missions and systems
requirements previously defined by the ACRV Office of the Space Station Freedom.
Finding #3:
The architecture of the ISS contains a Caution and Warning (C&W) system to detect and warn of
malfunctions and emergencies, including toxic spills, depressurization and fire. The system
makes use of laptop computers for localization of faults.
Recommendation #3:
Careful consideration should be given to the appropriateness of using laptop computers for a
task as time critical as localizing life-threatening emergencies. The entire fault detection and
localization process should use dedicated equipment to minimize response time.
NASA Response to Recommendation #3:
To address this issue, NASA has formed a temporary team, composed of personnel from Safety
and Mission Assurance, Command and Data Handling, and other teams. Program resolution of
these issues is expected by August 1995.
Finding #4:
The absence of experimental data for fire suppression effectiveness of the carbon dioxide extin-
guishers selected for use on the ISS under weightless conditions is a source of concern.
Recommendation #4:
Appropriate ground-based and in-flight research to confirm the suitability of the use of pressur-
ized carbon dioxide fire extinguishers under weightlessness should be conducted.
NASA Response to Recommendation #4:
Ground testing performed during the Space Station Freedom program conservatively demon-
strated the ability of the carbon dioxide fire extinguishers to produce adequate concentrations of
fire suppressant in closed volumes, such as racks. Additional ground testing is being pursued to
address areas, such as endcones and standoffs, not included in the Freedom configurations test-
ed. Upon successful demonstration that these new configurations do not exceed the capabilities
of the extinguishers to adequately perform, NASA will consider them to be suitable for use on
the Space Station.
Finding #5:
The present procedures for monitoring or controlling hazardous materials and procedures used in
ISS experiments are dependent on the experiment supplier complying with Station requirements
and specifications.
Recommendation #5:
For hazardous materials and procedures used in Space Station experiments, NASA should estab-
lish a positive system of compliance assurance modeled after the one used by the Space Shuttle
Program. This system should consider the entire service life of the experiment and its deactiva-
tion when completed.
NASA Response to Recommendation #5:
NASA agrees with and is complying with this recommendation. The Space Station program is
using the same Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) that the Space Shuttle program is using,
augmented with representatives from the Space Station program and the international partners.
The PSRP process document has been levied on the Space Station program, as has the payload
safety requirements document with a Station-specific addendum to cover the differing environ-
ments.
Finding #6:
Good progress has been made in defining the threat from orbital debris and in demonstrating
efficient shielding configurations. A technical basis for a debris protection specification for ISS
is emerging.
Recommendation #6:
Continue [orbital debris protection] design with emphasis on: structural integrity of habitable
modules and pressure vessels; identification of the damage potential from direct impact and
other depressurization events; and definition and development of operational procedures and
policies.
NASA Response to Recommendation #6:
NASA shares the ASAP's areas of concern related to orbital debris. The Space Station program
continues to place emphasis on the integrity of habitable modules and pressure vessels. As pre-
viously reported to the ASAP, we have implemented state-of-the-art enhanced shielding on the
U.S. Laboratory and Habitation modules. Similar approaches are being taken by the internation-
al partners to meet Space Station requirements. We are also continuing efforts to identify dam-
age potential from debris with ongoing penetration effects analysis and test activities at the
Marshall Space Flight Center. Operational procedures and policies for risk mitigation are under
development. Techniques for executing collision avoidance maneuvers are maturing and other
activities, including penetration detection and repair, are ongoing.
B. SHUTTLE/MIR (PHASE ONE) PROGRAM
Finding #7:
The Russian Androgynous Peripheral Docking System (APDS) for docking the Space Shuttle
with the Mir uses 12 active hooks on the Space Shuttle side which mate with an equal number of
passive hooks on the Mir. The design currently provides no positive means of determining
whether any or all of the hooks are secured. NASA has decided it is an acceptable risk to fly the
first docking mission, STS-71, without an indicator.
Recommendation #7:
NASA should develop an indicator system.
NASA Response to Recommendation #7:
The secondAPDS unit, which is being procured from RSC-Energia for the second and subse-
quent Mir missions, also does not have individual structural hook position indicators. The addi-
tion of indicators was discussed with RSC-Energia, however, the APDS manufacturing and
delivery schedule precluded installation. Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Rockwell engineers
have shown, through test and analysis, that there is no threat to crew and vehicle safety for the
remote failure case of two adjacent hooks failing to close properly. Combinations of failures that
would result in crew injury or vehicle damage are considered to be of remote probability, the risk
therefore being acceptable for the Phase I program. The Shuttle program has reviewed the test
and analysis results and approved the APDS baseline without position indicators for the Mir mis-
sions.
Thedesignspecificationfor APDSunitswhichwill beprocuredfrom RSC-Energiafor interna-
tional SpaceStationmissionapplicationscurrentlyrequirespositionindicationcapabilityfor all
structuralhookson theorbiter(active)sideof the interface,andpositionindicationfor gangsof
threestructuralhookson thestation(passive)side. In addition,theAPDSwhichwill be
installedon thePressurizedMatingAdapter-1,andcontrolledfrom theorbiteronSpaceStation
Mission-2A,will havepositiveindicationsonall structuralhooks.
Finding #8:
If the primary system fails, the first backup separation system for the APDS is a set of pyro bolts
which disengage the 12 active hooks. Having to rely on the pyros as presently supplied by the
Russian Space Agency poses risk because of lack of knowledge relating to the pyros' pedigree
and certification. A second contingency demate procedure is available involving the
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) removal of 96 bolts at a different interface. Implementing either
backup method to separate Shuttle from Mir may leave the Mir port unusable for future dock-
ings.
Recommendation #8:
NASA should emphasize increasing the reliability of the primary mating/demating mechanisms
in order to reduce the likelihood of having to use either of the backups. NASA should also
obtain an acceptable certification of the supplied pyro bolts. Failing that, NASA should procure
fully certified substitute bolts.
NASA Response to Recommendation #8:
The APDS mechanism hardware has been demonstrated by test to fully meet its design environ-
ments. Additional detail regarding critical mechanical components was jointly developed by
RSC-Energia, JSC, and Rockwell engineering, and analysis of those components has been com-
pleted. The analysis supports test results which demonstrate design margin for the life of the
Mir program. Additionally, the results for this analysis will be used as a guideline in developing
maintenance requirements for future Mir and Station missions. The pyrotechnics, installed in
the APDS, have completed a confidence test that was developed by Rockwell and NASA engi-
neering in conjunction with RSC-Energia and with the concurrence of NASA S&MA. NASA is
pursuing design improvements of the RSC-Energia bolts for Station missions and is also work-
ing on the development of an American-built pyrotechnic bolt.
RSC-Energia has not been receptive to the idea of installing American bolts in the APDS; how-
ever, assembly schedules do not require a decision until late 1995, and discussions with RSC-
Energia are continuing.
C. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
ORBITOR
Finding #9:
Significant additional payload mass capability is required to meet the demands of the assembly
and supply plans. Much of the needed increase in capacity will be achieved through weight
reduction programs on a number of Space Shuttle elements and subsystems. The large number
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of simultaneouschangescreatespotentialtrackingandcommunicationproblemsamongsystem
managers.
Recommendation #9:
Emphasis should be placed on the adequate integration of all of the changes into the total sys-
tem.
NASA Response to Recommendation #9:
Integration of major changes into the existing Space Shuttle vehicle is receiving emphasis by the
Space Shuttle program. The Space Shuttle program has had a system in place for many years to
integrate all of the changes into the total system. This system has proven effective.
The system consists of technical panels, integrated product teams, and control boards. A techni-
cal panel exists for each major functional area (e.g., Loads and Dynamics, Thermal). These
technical panels integrate and review the technical aspects of the analysis and testing. The func-
tional areas are integrated by the integrated product teams (e.g., Propulsion System Integration
Group) and at joint panel meetings.
The control boards, at the project and program level, provide a final technical review and inte-
gration, and management direction for cost and schedule control.
The NASA Element Project Offices and prime contractors are represented on the technical pan-
els, integrated product teams, and control boards, allowing cross communication and input at all
levels of the process.
There is a System Integration Plan for each of the major performance enhancements that defines
the responsibilities of the affected elements, identifies deliverable products and hardware, and
defines the system schedule for that enhancement to support the first element launch.
Finding #10:
The New Gas Generator Valve Module (NGGVM), when certified and retrofitted to the fleet,
should mitigate many of the problems with the current Improved Gas Generator Valve Module in
the Improved Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPU). The NGGVM development program is proceeding
well.
Recommendation #10:
NASA should attempt to introduce the NGGVM into the fleet as soon as possible as a safety and
logistics improvement.
NASA Response to Recommendation #10:
NASA intends to introduce the NGGVM into the fleet on an opportunity basis. The ground rule
for this plan is to maintain a minimum Kennedy Space Center (KSC) stock level of five spare
IAPU's to support any unplanned line replaceable unit removals. Any other IAPU's not required
to support this stock level will be shipped to Sundstrand to undergo the NGGVM modification.
By leaving this number of spare IAPU's on the shelf at KSC and modifying any units available
beyondthat,theNGGVM implementationinto thefleetcanbecompletedin late 1998orearly
1999.Upgradeandmodificationof threeAuxiliary PowerUnits currentlynot usedfor flight as
anexpedientto theNGGVM fleet retrofit isnotcosteffective.
Finding #11:
The decision has been made to install the entire Multi-Function Electronic Display System
(MEDS) in each Orbiter during a single Orbiter Maintenance and Down Period (OMDP). An
Advanced Orbiter Displays/System Working Group has been formed to plan for the next genera-
tion of MEDS formats and display enhancements.
Recommendation #11:
NASA should support the Advanced Orbiter Displays/System Working Group and set a
timetable for the introduction of enhanced display
formats which will improve both safety and operability. It should also maintain its commitment
to completing the MEDS installations during a single OMDP.
NASA Response to Recommendation #11:
NASA established the Advanced Orbiter Displays/System Working Group to define next-genera-
tion cockpit displays that will take advantage of MEDS data processing capabilities to improve
safety and operability. The Government/industry working group is currently defining require-
ments for enhanced displays as well as a timetable for both evaluation of candidate displays in
MEDS testbeds and introduction of new displays into orbiters.
NASA identified several advantages to installing MEDS hardware in orbiters during a single
OMDP. Current OMDP planning as well as the schedule for first flight of MEDS on each
orbiter reflects the single OMDP installation plan.
Finding #12:
The Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN) and Microwave Scanning Beam Landing
System (MSBLS) on-board receivers are obsolescent and increasingly difficult to maintain. The
MSBLS receivers also have known design problems which can lead to erroneous guidance infor-
mation if the orbiter is operating with only two of the three receiver complement. A Global
Positioning System (GPS) test is underway on one of the orbiters using the backup flight soft-
ware and computer. The use of GPS could replace both the TACAN and MSBLS systems as
well as assisting ascent and on-orbit operations.
Recommendation #12:
Given the potential of GPS to improve safety and reliability, reduce weight and avoid obsoles-
cence and the many existing and potential problems with the use of TACAN and MSBLS, a full
GPS implementation on the orbiter should be accomplished as soon as possible.
NASA Response to Recommendation #12:
The Space Shuttle program is currently reviewing a plan to fully implement the GPS capabili-
ties. The GPS hardware/software implementation plan calls for completing the installation of a
redundant GPS hardware capability as early as the year 2000. The software implementation will
be completed with delivery of the OI-27 operational increment by December 1997 with a first
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flight effectivity in the summer of 1998. The redundant GPS hardware installation will be
accomplished during the OMDP for each orbiter.
Finding #13:
Growth in the requirements for on-board data processing will continue as the Space Shuttle is
used in support of Shuttle/Mir, ISS and other future missions. The length of time over which the
General Purpose Computer and its software will be able to meet these growing needs effectively
is likely inadequate.
Recommendation #13:
NASA should expedite a long-range strategic hardware and software planning effort to identify
ways to supply future computational needs of the Space Shuttle throughout its lifetime.
Postponing this activity invites a critical situation in the future.
NASA Response to Recommendation #I3:
We concur that continued reliance on the Space Shuttle beyond 2005 will demand some major
revisions to the core General Purpose Computer (GPC) hardware and software, if for no other
reason than the inability to maintain hardware based on early 1980 technology. Such a revision,
given the tightly coupled interdependencies of the present core architecture, would logically be
accomplished as a major "block" update rather than gradually evolving to a new architecture.
The block update approach can also serve to reduce future operations costs by stabilizing avion-
ics hardware and software during the Station assembly era. In accord with that concept, the
Space Shuttle program is considering an approach that would freeze the GPC software at rough-
ly the turn of the century, following the incorporation of Station-driven enhancements. That
freeze would allow for diversion of engineering resources, heretofore devoted to routinely evolv-
ing enhancements, to pursue a true significant block update sufficient to sustain the Space
Shuttle past 2020.
As the foundation for such a possible architecture, the JSC Engineering Directorate has devel-
oped a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) for high-fidelity emulation of the present
GPC. That emulation is capable of real-time bit-level execution of actual object code produced
by the HAL/S compiler. It will soon be made available to allow flight software developers a tar-
get machine for early development testing. At the present time, such early testing is a premium
because of the limited availability of real GPC's. The extension of the emulator concept, as a
candidate to replace the actual flight GPC's, is the next logical step. It would preserve critical
flight code, thereby minimizing the reverification costs, while still providing a modern platform
for growth.
In summary, NASA does have the essential formative elements for a long-range strategic hard-
ware and software upgrade effort in work. Existing limited resources and ongoing program activ-
ities obviously preclude any definitive strategic planning until completion of the current pro-
gramwide restructuring activities. Once those activities are complete, a more definitive plan and
schedule, predicated on critical examination of limited available resources, can be developed.
Finding #14:
The STS-64 mission involved a higher than usual level of windshield hazing which could have
led to a situation in which the astronauts' view of the landing runway was obscured. MSBLS
and TACAN are obsolescent. There is also the possibility that false indications by MSBLS
under certain scenarios could result in an unacceptable risk of a landing mishap. Thus there is a
clear need for early upgrade of orbiter and support facility autoland equipment and crew flight
rules and training improvement.
Recommendation #14:
NASA should improve the autoland equipment on the Orbiter; for example, replacing MSBLS
and TACAN with GPS. In the interim, NASA should ensure that operations and failure modes
of MSBLS are fully examined and understood. NASA should also reexamine the training of
crews for executing automatic landings, including autoland system familiarization. Astronaut
commanders and pilots should discuss circumstances which might warrant autoland use prior to
each mission and be prepared for all reasonable contingencies in its operation.
NASA Response to Recommendation #14:
Incorporation of GPS is being pursued as aggressively as funding and technical constraints will
allow. The program has approved plans and funding to provide a single-string GPS capability
that can be flown in the summer of 1997 as a first step toward TACAN/MSBLS replacement.
Plans for a full three-string operational system have been approved for OI-27, and detailed costs
and schedules are being assessed by the program. The failure modes of the MSBLS have been
analyzed and are documented in the program's Critical Item List.
The finding made by the ASAP regarding the STS-64 mission, involving a higher than usual
level of windshield hazing that could have led to a situation in which the astronaut's view of the
landing runway was obscured, is incorrect. The STS-64 orbiter Quick Look Reports states:
"Orbiter Windows 3 and 4 exhibited light hazing and streaks were seen on 4." Additionally, the
Commander (Richard N. Richards, 4th flight) reports that the window hazing was not unusual at
all, typical of what is usually seen, and an excellent view of the runway was obtained at all times
during the approach, landing, and rollout phases of the flight. The STS-64 vehicle touchdown
parameters were excellent, confirming that the Commander had an excellent view of all visual
aids throughout the approach and landing. (These touchdown parameters include touchdown
airspeed of 198 knots versus 195 planned, touchdown distance of 2386 feet versus predicted
2505, sink rate at touchdown of 1.0 feet per second, and a threshold crossing height of 20 feet.
All parameters are excellent.)
Extensive analysis of the orbiter autoland system has been performed by various organizations in
NASA, including exhaustive reviews by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance personnel. Those
results have been briefed to all levels of NASA management. The Space Shuttle program has
not identified/defined any hardware or software change that is necessary to improve the autoland
capability. The operational use of the autoland capability remains at the discretion of the mis-
sion commander. To educate pilots and commanders on the use of this emergency system,
Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) provides a briefing that covers the capabilities and
limitations of the autoland system, as well as the contingency cases for which it is a viable alter-
native (i.e., both pilots incapacitated, or a highly inaccurate weather forecast for landing). In
8
addition, each crew has a session in the Shuttle Mission Simulator, as well as the Shuttle
Training Aircraft where the autoland system is demonstrated and discussed.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
Finding #15:
It has become necessary to execute a partial disassembly of both the engines and turbopumps
after each flight because of the accumulation of special inspection requirements and service life
limits on components of the current (Phase II) SSMEs. These inspections are performed with
rigor and appropriate attention to detail.
Recommendation #15:
In order to control risk, NASA must maintain the present level of strict discipline and attention
to detail in carrying out inspection and assembly processes to ensure the reliability and safety of
the SSMEs even after the Block I and Block II upgrades are introduced.
NASA Response to Recommendation #15:
NASA agrees with this recommendation and will continue to perform the detailed inspections of
the Phase II Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) that are currently defined. The postflight
inspections of both the Block I and Block II SSME's will be significantly less in frequency than
those for today's Phase II SSME due to the major design changes, especially in the turbopumps.
However, the program plans to use the same level of strict discipline and attention to detail in
carrying out the new inspection program as it has in the past.
Finding #16:
The re-start of the Advanced Turbopump Program (ATP) High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
(HPFTP) and the start of the Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber (LTMCC) developments
were authorized in the spring of 1994. Combined with the ongoing component developments of
the Block I engine, this will produce a Block II engine which will contain all of the major com-
ponent improvements that have been recommended over the past decade to enhance the safety
and reliability of the SSME. Both the Block I and Block II programs have made excellent
progress during the current year and are meeting their technical objectives.
Recommendation #16:
Continue the development of the Block II modifications for introduction at the earliest possible
time.
NASA Response to Recommendation #I6:
NASA agrees with this recommendation, l'he first flight of the Block I SSME was on STS-70,
which was launched on July 13, 1995. The Block II SSME will be available for flight in
September 1997.
Finding #17:
In order to provide an engine health monitoring system that can significantly enhance the safety
of the SSME, improvements must be made in the reliability of the engine sensors and the com-
putational capacity of the controller. It is also essential to eliminate the difficulties with the
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cables and connectors of the Flight Accelerometer Safety Cut-Off System (FASCOS) so that
vibration data can be included in the parameters used in the algorithms that determine engine
health.
Recommendation #17:
Expand and emphasize the program to improve engine health monitoring. Continue the program
of sensor improvements. Vigorously address and solve the cable and connector problems that
exist in FASCOS. Continue the development of health monitoring algorithms which reduce
false alarms and increase the detectability of true failures.
NASA Response to Recommendation #17:
The Space Shuttle program is implementing Discharge Temperature Thermocouples as a
replacement for the current temperature sensors on the SSME's. No other health monitoring
improvements are funded at this time because the design was not mature enough to make this a
cost-effective project.
Finding #18:
The Block II SSME can improve safety if an abort is required because it can be operated more
confidently at a higher thrust level. This will permit greater flexibility in the selection among
abort modes.
Recommendation #18:
NASA should reexamine the relative risks of the various abort types given the projected operat-
ing characteristics of the Block II SSMEs. Particular emphasis should be placed on the possibil-
ity of eliminating or significantly reducing exposure to a Return to Launch Site abort.
NASA Response to Recommendation #18:
Operating the Block II SSME's at a higher power level requires completion of two certification
activities--the Block II SSME hardware certification and the integrated vehicle intact abort cer-
tification (loads, thermal, guidance, navigation and control). Because the internal environments
and stresses are significantly reduced for Block II SSME's, the Space Shuttle program approved
certification testing to include 109-percent power level for intact abort operations. This allows
for the future consideration of increasing the power level for intact aborts to 109 percent pending
the results of certification testing. If the increase in power level for intact aborts proves feasible,
it would reduce, but not eliminate, exposure to the Return-to-Launch Site abort mode.
Performance enhancements vehicle ascent certification environments are currently being devel-
oped using 106-percent power level for intact abort operations to improve abort performance and
to minimize the risk of design impacts to the Space Shuttle vehicle. A delta certification plan to
incorporate 109-percent power level for intact abort operations is currently being developed.
Implementation of the plan is contingent on a successful Block II SSME test program, the results
of vehicle thermal and structural loads trade studies, and the delta certification cost and sched-
ule. Further, even if certification is successful, the decision to utilize 109-percent power level for
intact aborts will depend on actual flight experience with the Block II SSME's.
10
EXTERNAL TANK
Finding #19:
The liquid oxygen tank aft dome gore panel thickness of the Super Lightweight Tank (SLWT)
has been reduced significantly on the basis of analyses. To stiffen the dome, a rib was added.
The current plan to verify the strength of the aft dome involves a proof test only to limit load.
Buckling phenomena cannot be extrapolated with confidence between limit and ultimate loads.
Recommendation #19:
The SLWT aft dome should either be tested to ultimate loads or its strength should be increased
to account for the uncertainties in extrapolation.
NASA Response to Recommendation #19:
NASA agrees with this recommendation. At the joint NASA and Martin Marietta Aluminum
Lithium Test Article (ALTA) Design Review on August 19, 1994, an aft LO2 dome test was
added to the ALTA test program. Adding this stability test will permit the aft dome to be verified
to the ultimate load condition. The as-planned test satisfies the buckling concerns of Finding
#19.
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRB)
Finding #20:
The structural tests of a segment of an SRB aft skirt in the baseline configuration did not dupli-
cate the strains and stresses previously measured in the tests of the full-scale aft skirt Structural
Test Article (STA-3). This suggests that segment testing of the proposed bracket modification to
improve the aft skirt's factor of safety may not be valid.
Recommendation #20:
NASA should reassess the use of the segment test method and reconsider the use of a full scale
test article for qualifying the proposed bracket reinforcement.
NASA Response to Recommendation #20:
At the time of the NASA response to the March 1994 ASAP Annual Report, two initial test con-
dition baselining test articles (TA) had been tested to 100- and 70-percent load levels. The TA-1
and TA-3 test loads were analytically derived and validated using empirical data from these tests
and STA-3. The TA-3 baseline testing showed excellent correlation with strain response curves
measured during the STA-3 test. In addition, a second test article was tested to failure. Strain
data obtained from these two specimens was compared to the STA-3 strain data (up to 128-per-
cent loads which was the maximum load level achieved prior to failure initiation during the STA-
3 test program). Data from second baseline test, the bracket test, and STA-3 are depicted in the
figure below. The strain measurements for the critical weld region for the full-load applications
(0 to 128-percent loads) exhibit an average correlation within 8.6 percent and, at 128-percent
load levels, the average correlation is within 9.6 percent.
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Thefirst of thetwo testarticlesthatweretestedto failure failedat 167-percentloadlevel; the
secondat 155-percentloadlevel. Thecorrespondingstrainsat theindicatorgageat failurewere
-17,000 and -13,500 microstrain; by comparison, the STA-3 measurements indicated 6,704
microstrain at 128-percent load level (the level of failure). It was also noted that STA-2B, a skirt
test for the filament wound case program tested in 1986, failed at 10,708 microstrain at 129-per-
cent load level. Comparison of the test results indicates variability exists in the failure strains at
the critical gage locations. The apparent disparity was investigated by NASA using a fault-tree
methodology. Although no specific cause has been identified for this variability, the following
items are probable contributors:
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• Material property variation between the test articles.
• Residual stresses resulting from assembly, welding, and/or previous use.
• Other skirt-to-skirt variation; geometry, tolerances and strain-gage location.
• Component test not accurately representing the full-skirt configuration.
• An unidentified contributor.
• A combination of the above factors.
Following this investigation, the cost/benefit of proceeding with the test team investigation ver-
sus ending the effort was evaluated and the investigation terminated. The following rationale
supported this decision.
The test program also included testing with a bracketed test article. The article was tested to the
limits of the test support structure (270-percent load level) without a weld failure occurring. A
comparison between the two test configurations (with and without the bracket) demonstrated a
minimum increase in capability of the bracketed skirt section of 62 percent. This indicates that
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theadditionof theexternalbracketwouldreturntheaft skirt critical weldfactorof safetyto a
valuein excessof 2.0. Thetwo tests,performedin thesamemannerandtestconfiguration,
shouldallowcomparablequantitativeevaluationof performance.The62-percentincreasein
capabilitymitigatessignificantlyanyconcernswith theminorvariations(<10percent)in strain
levelsbetweencomponentestarticlesandSTA-3up to 128percent,andthosevariationsin load
capabilitymeasuredduringtheentiretyof thetestseries.
Thepedigreeof flight hardwareisassessedfollowing eachflight andastatisticalpedigreehas
beenestablished.Evaluationof skirts,following 67successfullaunchesplusFlight Readiness
Firings andpadaborts,hasidentifiednodeteriorationof theweldsasaresultof flight loads.
STA-3sustained100-percentloadfor bothprelaunchandreboundcases.Theinitial weld failure
occurredat 128percentwith sufficientstructuralredundancyto allowcontinuedloadingto 142
percent.Theskirt reactedloadsweregreaterthanthedesignlimit for morethan7 minutesafter
the initial failure.
Theflight hardwareassessmentandloadingincludesthefollowing:
a.TheMobileLaunchPlatform(MLP) sphericalbearingsarenowbiasedradially
inwardto ensurefavorableassemblyconditionsexist. Thesupportpostbush-
ings/bearingshavebeenlockedto precludetheundesirableeffectsof loadslip.
b.Eachskirt hasbeeninstrumented(only onehasyet to beincludedin this data
base)to measurethesystemstrains.Thishasresultedin 52setsof full-scale
straindatafrom 27flights. Thedatacorrespondwell with STA-3andthecompo-
nenttesting. TheaveragepeakstrainduringtheSSMEthrustbuildupis 4181
microstrainwith astandarddeviationof 381microstrain.Themaximummea-
suredstrainwas5072microstrain(excludingSTS-44,S/N 20029which recorded
anapparentstrainlevelof 5488microstraindueto theBauschingereffect). The
comparablestrainfrom thetestprograms(includingSTA-3)at 100-percentload
wasapproximately5080microstrain.
c.Variationin on-padloads,asindicatedby MLP instrumentationandverifiedby
theaft skirt straingagedata,is small.
In summary,componentestresultsindicatethattheexternalbracketsignificantlyenhancescriti-
calweld factorsof safety. In additionto providingsubstantivequantitativeverificationof exist-
ing analyticaltechniques,thecompletedevaluationof thetestprogramresultshasprovidedno
challengeto or indictmentof currentflight rationale.Theresultantpotentialbenefitsfrom intro-
ductionof thebracketarelimited. Thedesignchangehasminimal potentialfor increasingthe
Shuttlelift-off wind allowables(andassociatedprobabilityof launch),asotherelementsaresim-
ilarly constraining.Theeliminationof theAdvancedSolidRocketMotor effort precludesnear-
termconcernsfor substantiallyincreasedskirt loading. Thesignificantcomponent,subscaleand
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full-scaleanalysisandtest,alongwith individualizedmeasurementsof each aft skirt, provide a
level of understanding such that no further concerns exist for a demonstrated 1.28 factor of safe-
ty in the critical weld area. Therefore, implementation of the bracket is not planned at this time,
and the program plans to change the appropriate specification requirement to reflect this factor
of safety to avoid repetitive flight-by-flight waivers.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT
Finding #21:
The effort by the NASA logistics organization and its principal contractors has resulted in satis-
factory performance. There remain a few problems, such as a tendency towards increased canni-
balization, which still require attention.
Recommendation #21:
Every effort should be made to avoid cannibalizations, particularly on critical components such
as the SSME and the IAPU.
NASA Response to Recommendation #21:
While there were some increases in cannibalizations in mid-1994, continued management atten-
tion has maintained an overall decreasing trend in cannibalizations. Close attention to related
indicators will continue. There are currently four spare IAPU's on the shelf at KSC. No IAPU
cannibalizations have occurred since 1993.
Finding #22:
The Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP) continues to meet at six-month intervals, usually at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or the Marshall Space Flight Center. The ILP serves a valuable
coordinating and liaison function for the entire logistics operation. Its personnel complement
has been reduced as part of the overall NASA staff cutbacks.
Recommendation #22:
NASA should maintain support of an effective ILE
NASA Response to Recommendation #22:
Space Shuttle program and project elements continue to support the ILP and related integration
activities. Even though personnel cutbacks have been experienced, the ILP is still an effective
forum for problem solving, lessons learned, and technical information exchange. In addition, the
prime contractors continue to benefit from the exchange of technical data presented at these
meetings.
Finding #23:
There is a plan to consolidate all logistics elements at KSC except Spacelab over the next three
or four years. This should unify the entire logistics and supply organization. The realignments
are intended to eliminate duplication of effort, gain efficiency in support and materially reduce
the cost of operation.
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Recommendation #23:
Proceed as outlined in the NASA plan.
NASA Response to Recommendation #23:
A single organization consolidating all KSC logistics elements was officially established on
April 17, 1995. This new organization integrates logistics functions from the Payload
Management and Operations Directorate, the Installation Management and Operations
Directorate, the Engineering Development Directorate, and the Shuttle Management and
Operations Directorate. This new organization, known as the Logistics Operations Directorate,
is now proceeding with internal realignments to eliminate duplication, increase efficiency, and
reduce costs while improving customer service.
D. AERONAUTICS
Finding #24:
NASA has entered into a contract with the Tupolev Design Bureau of Russia to support flights of
a TU-144 supersonic airplane for a joint U.S./Russian research program. The TU-144 has a
questionable safety record, and the particular airplane to be used has not been flown for a num-
ber of years. The level of assurance available for this flight project may not be equivalent to that
typically associated with NASA's flight research programs.
Recommendation #24:
NASA should assure that all design and safety data and operational characteristics of this vehicle
have been fully explored.
NASA Response to Recommendation #24:
The TU-144 Supersonic Flight Research program was developed in consonance with the
Gore/Chernomyrdin Agreement on Aeronautics Cooperation of June 1993. The TU- 144, as a
supersonic testbed aircraft, provides an opportunity to obtain in-flight measurements of informa-
tion pertinent to future development of a High-Speed Civil Transport aircraft. Given this oppor-
tunity, the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry encouraged NASA, as part of its High Speed
Research (HSR) program, to institute an effort that would return a TU-144 aircraft to flight sta-
tus and conduct a series of flight experiments on the upgraded and instrumented aircraft. A
NASA/U.S. industry team has been formulated to lead the effort that will result in the aircraft
being returned to a flight status for the completion of six flight experiments.
Prior to contracting for the aircraft refurbishment and instrumentation, a detailed feasibility
study was conducted and reported to NASA in December 1993 by Rockwell International
Corporation. Also, a series of ground tests and subsystem checkouts were conducted by Tupolev
in February 1994 on the aircraft to be upgraded. These tests exercised fuel, hydraulic, and
avionics systems and identified line replaceable units that would need to be modified, refur-
bished, or replaced. TU-144 design and operations data were delivered to the U.S. team as part
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of these studies and tests. Given favorable results from these feasibility assessments, a contract
for the aircraft modification and instrumentation was awarded in August 1994. These program
phases are currently in progress. Boeing is the lead U.S. contractor (with McDonnell Douglas
sharing a partnership role) and Rockwell International is a subcontractor with responsibility for
oversight of aircraft modifications performed by Tupolev.
As part of the aircraft modification phase, the U.S. team requested and was provided with
detailed design and safety data required to ensure mission safety and success. In addition, mis-
sion planning and flight manifest determinations are being conducted concurrently with the air-
craft modification. Tupolev has provided detailed operational data and characteristics obtained
during initial TU-144 flight testing. Tupolev and NASA engineers are actively involved in the
mission planning activities. Rockwell has hired a full-time engineer at their permanent office in
Moscow who serves as an onsite representative at Tupolev and provides regular status reports to
the U.S. team. The Rockwell representative has many years of experience in Russian aviation as
an employee of the Gromov Flight Research Institute and the Kamov Helicopter Company. He
is very knowledgeable about the Russian aircraft industry and the Russian airworthiness process.
Given the international nature of the program and the fact that all of the flights to be conducted
under this program will be flown in Russia, it was understood that Russian airworthiness and
certification procedures would be utilized to ensure airworthiness of the aircraft. The U.S.
industry/NASA TU-144 project team concerned with airworthiness has spent significant effort to
understand the Russian processes. A white paper summarizing the U.S. team's understanding of
the Russian processes is available in the HSR program office. This understanding was devel-
oped during the course of several reviews of the progress of the aircraft modifications and mutu-
al planning of the flight experiments. U.S. personnel have been to Moscow three times between
August 1994 and June 1995. Russian personnel have been to the U.S. twice during the same
period. The airworthiness process has been a subject of consideration at all of the international
interchanges. Prior to the first TU-144 flight, another review of the aircraft modifications is
scheduled for September 1995. The U.S. industry/NASA personnel (including safety and mis-
sion assurance personnel) are scheduled to attend the Russian flight readiness methodological
council meeting in January 1996.
Detailed review of results from the feasibility studies, ground and system checks, aircraft modifi-
cation reviews, mission planning, and the flight readiness methodological council meeting, all
represent the effort that the U.S. industry/NASA team will expend toward ensuring that all
design and safety data and operational characteristics of the aircraft have been fully explored.
This is evidenced by the deletion of the supersonic boom experiment because of unresolved
issues in flight operations, flight safety, and cost.
Finding #25:
Wind shear encounters, while infrequent, constitute a highly significant aviation hazard that has
been a causal factor in major crashes. A joint NASA/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
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Airborne Wind Shear Sensor Program has developed methods, already being implemented, for
providing timely warning to aircraft in danger of encountering such atmospheric conditions.
Recommendation #25:
Continue research relating to wind shear and other aircraft-threatening phenomena, such as wake
vortices, and the transfer of related technologies to users.
NASA Response to Recommendation #25;
NASA's Windshear program is now complete. The results of this successful wind-shear technol-
ogy program were adopted by the avionics manufacturers for their development into safety tech-
nology for transport aircraft. One manufacturer, AlliedSignal, provided Continental Airlines,
one of their customers, with their Model RDR-4D system. This is a combined weather radar and
wind-shear radar. It was first flown in commercial service in December 1994. With the comple-
tion of the wind-shear program, NASA's expertise and facilities will be applied to the challenges
posed by safely increasing the airport traffic capacity and especially the issues associated with
wind-vortex encounters. The research consists of identifying and mathematically modeling
wake vortices using computational fluid dynamics, existing empirical models and data from
required wind tunnel and flight tests, developing and demonstrating a sensor to reveal the hazard
to the flight crew, and validating a total system at a Center/Terminal Radar Approach Control
(TRACON) Automation System (CTAS) field test site. Much of the technology and approach in
this area is enabled by the previously successful development of wind-shear models and sensors.
Finding #26:
NASA has a coordinated program of tire research operating from the Langley Research and
Dryden Flight Research Centers. This program has the capability to provide significant safety
improvements for present and future aircraft and spacecraft.
Recommendation #26:
In addition to supporting the Space Shuttle and other research programs such as the High Speed
Civil Transport, NASA should continue to emphasize and transfer lessons learned in the tire
research effort to all segments of the user community.
NASA Response to Recommendation #26:
The CV-990 Landing System Research Aircraft (LSRA) project operated by Dryden Flight
Research Center (DFRC) has been instrumental in defining Shuttle orbiter main gear tire perfor-
mance. This program has been completed. Test results have been provided to the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE), Boeing, Northrop, McDonnell Douglas, and Canadair.
Unanimous agreement exists between Government agencies, the tire industry, and academia that
this test facility is unique and supplies, in many areas, the highest fidelity in tire and landing gear
testing ever achieved.
NASA is working with the FAA, Canadair, The Canadian Joint Aviation Authority, and others on
winter runway friction issues in a proposed 5-year program. This program involves braking test
runs with NASA's B-737, B-757, and CV-990 LSRA, together with several different ground
friction measuring vehicles and parametric studies, using Langley's Aircraft Landing Dynamics
Facility. Results of this program will have a direct impact on not only solving runway friction
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andairportcongestionproblems,butalsohelpingindustryachieveimprovedtire designs,better
chemicaltreatmentsfor snowandice,andrunwaysurfacesthatminimize adverseweather
effects. Flight-crewrecognitionof lessthanacceptablereportedrunwayfriction conditions,
prior to thego/no-goor theland/goarounddecisionpoint,is oneof thenear-termgoals.
Finding #27:
The Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) has completed a demonstration of the concept of a
Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA) system using an F-15 aircraft flight test and an MD-11
simulator demonstration. This system permits an aircraft to be guided to a landing in an emer-
gency using only thrust for flight path control. DFRC is now exploring a joint program with
industry to extend the demonstration to a flight test on a large commercial aircraft. Although the
PCA concept has been proved, the pilot control interface aspects of the design have yet to be
systematically addressed.
Recommendation #27:
Any flight test program on a large commercial aircraft should include a strong focus on selecting
the optimum pilot control interface for the system.
NASA Response to Recommendation #27:
Aircraft pilot interface is critical when dealing with emergency situations. Therefore, the PCA
project has conducted simulator studies that addressed the pilot interface with the PCA system.
A comprehensive study in the Ames Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator looked at inputting
PCA commands using modern sidestick controllers and autopilot glare shield control panel
(GSCP) knobs (pitch and heading/track). Six pilots flew 100 approaches with various levels of
turbulence. Pilot ratings, touchdown dispersions, and pilot opinions all showed a preference for
using the GSCP knobs. The slow response of the PCA is more consistent with the autopilot
response that is commanded by the GSCP controllers. It was shown that in an emergency situa-
tion, the use of sidestick controller to command the slow PCA system could result in a Pilot
Induced Oscillation. The pilots will be specifically requested to address aircraft pilot interfaces
during the upcoming MD-11 PCA evaluation flights.
Finding #28:
The range safety policy for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations within the Edwards Air
Force Base range worked when the Perseus program suffered an in-flight failure. Range safety
for Perseus flights outside of the controlled airspace at Edwards has yet to be addressed.
Recommendation #28:
Consideration should now be given to establishing a UAV policy to cover Perseus flights con-
ducted outside of controlled airspace at Edwards.
NASA Response to Recommendation #28:
The use of non-Edwards controlled airspace falls under the regulation of the FAA. The Office of
Aeronautics, through the Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST)
program, has for the past 2 years been participating in workshops sponsored by the FAA for the
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purposeof developingFederalAviationRegulationsneededto establishtheappropriateover-
sightof RemotelyPilotedAircraft flight operationsin theNationalAirspaceSystem.Draft
Advisory Circularshavebeenpreparedandarecurrentlyundergoinglegalreview. TheERAST
programwill continueto workwith theFAA towardimplementingtheneededregulations.
E. OTHER
Finding #29:
The Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER) was successfully flight tested on the STS-64 mis-
sion. Although designed as a rescue device for an astronaut who becomes untethered, SAFER
has demonstrated its potential to assist in other safety-critical situations such as contingency
EVAs. Five SAFER flight units have been ordered. Plans are to deploy them on Mir and Space
Station as well as to carry them on the Space Shuttle only when an EVA is planned.
Recommendation #29:
Once the flight units are available, NASA should consider routinely flying SAFER units on all
Space Shuttle missions which do not have severe weight limitations. This will permit them to be
used for those contingency EVAs in which safety can be improved
by giving crew members the capability to translate to the location of a problem to make an
inspection or effect a repair.
NASA Response to Recommendation #29:
NASA has considered routinely flying SAFER units on all Space Shuttle missions which do not
have severe weight limitations and has decided that it is not required.
SAFER was specifically designed to be used to rescue an EVA crewmember who had become
inadvertently detached from a structure under the circumstances where the Shuttle could not
credibly effect a rescue (for example, during Space Station operations when the Shuttle is either
not at the Station or is docked to it). As such, it is classified as an "emergency" device and only
needs to be single-string (i.e., zero-fault tolerant).
SAFER is not required for other (operational) EVA's. All known, credible, contingency EVA's
can be safely accomplished without it. There currently exists an EVA method to get to the
External Tank (ET) umbilical doors located on the Orbiter without SAFER, for which each EVA
crewmember is briefed prior to flight.
Furthermore, the cost of making SAFER operational on all Shuttle flights would be high. To be
used as other than an emergency device, significant redesign would be required to make it at
least single-fault tolerant. SAFER cannot be stowed on the Primary Life Support Subsystem in
the airlock; therefore, special stowage would be required on each flight. Flying two SAFER
units on each flight would require stowage for about 8 cubic feet and 200 pounds. Additional
EVA training would also be required each time SAFER is flown, regardless of whether or not it
is planned to be used.
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Given theabovereasonsincluding thefact thatall known,credible,contingencyEVA'scanbe
safelyaccomplishedwithout SAFER,NASA believesthatimplementingthisrecommendationis
notappropriateat this time.
Finding #30:
NASAhas established a Software Process Action Team (SPAT)to review and develop plans for
addressing the software concerns that have been raised within NASA and by several review
boards including the National Research Council and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
While NASA has extensive procedures for addressing software issues in some arenas, these
issues have not received uniform recognition of their importance throughout the Agency.
Recommendation #30:
NASA should ensure that computer software issues are given high priority throughout the
agency and that those addressing these issues are given the support needed to produce adequate
ways of dealing with them. The creation of the SPAT was an important initial step toward deal-
ing with complex safety critical problems, but much more needs to be done.
NASA Response tO Recommendation #30
NASA fully agrees with the recommendation that computer software issues must be given a high
priority throughout the Agency. Recent actions taken and decisions made in the Zero-Base
Review operating guidelines supports the NASA senior managers" high priority for the critical
and complex software issues. NASA offered a pilot Software Program/Project Management
course in March 1995. This training exhibits a priority of software issues within NASA. The
follow-on "Software Acquisition" training course will be provided in August 1995 to NASA
managers with significant software in their projects.
The Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Center of Excellence addresses complex
critical software issues across NASA with the Software Improvement Initiative and IV&V on
projects. The Agencywide Software Improvement program and the Agencywide Software
Working Group will coordinate software issues that affect the Agency. The Software Working
Group Charter gives each member the responsibility and authority to represent the software
needs of their respective Center. The consolidation of IV&V projects to the NASA facility aids
in addressing software issues with uniform recognition of importance across the Agency.
The Program Office representation to the Software Working Group has been strengthened. The
Software Process Action Team merged with an existing working group to formulate the current
Software Working Group, with cochairs from the IV&V Center of Excellence and the Chief
Engineer's Office. Active Program Office support and participation in the Software Working
Group would better accomplish the ASAP's Recommendation #30.
Finding #31:
There were several in-flight and ground-based episodes in which astronauts developed adverse
reactions to substances used in human experiments. Although the researchers guiding these
experiments submit the protocols to standard Institutional Review Board (IRB) process, there is
no independent oversight of the safety of human experiments within NASA.
20
Recommendation #31:
NASA should provide independent oversight of human experimentation by establishing a review
process in addition to the standard IRB and ensuring that the Space Shuttle and Space Station
systems requirements provide sufficient equipment, staffing and training to react appropriately to
any problems which might be experienced.
NASA Response to Recommendation #31:
NASA has disbanded the former Human Research Policy and Procedures Committee (HRPCC)
and replaced it with an IRB. This IRB has a broader representation from operationally oriented
people and physicians in addition to the researchers formerly constituting the HRPCC. Also,
there is a safety representative from the JSC Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
that participates as a member of the new IRB. NASA believes that the broader representation,
combined with the continued presence of the safety representative, provides the appropriate level
of safety oversight for this review process that is being sought by the ASAR This also corrects
previous shortcomings in the review process. The oversight processes of the JSC Office of
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance and the International Space Station Independent
Assessment Panel have been designed to assure that requirements deficiencies related to equip-
ment, staffing, and training that may exist in the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs are
identified and dealt with appropriately.
Finding #32:
The number of reports submitted to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has nearly
doubled since 1988 and has consistently been above the levels projected when the system was
started. In these same years, budgetary resources have remained flat so that, even with signifi-
cant productivity increases, the portion of incidents that receive detailed analysis has declined.
In addition, ASRS has not been able to develop cost effective electronic dissemination of advi-
sories or a program of educational outreach to expand use of ASRS by the aviation community,
both of which would be significant safety enhancements.
Recommendation #32:
NASA and the FAA should restore the full capability of analysis, interpretation, and dissemina-
tion of the ASRS and promote electronic dissemination and expanded educational outreach.
NASA Response to Recommendation #32:
In 1993, the FAA asked the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to review this
program and to recommend how to improve and evolve the system. In August 1994, NAPA pub-
lished their report concluding that ASRS is "a credible, resilient and worthwhile program" and
cited it as a model for interagency cooperation. Recommendations from this report led to the
formation of an FAA/NASA interagency team to develop an action plan that was submitted in
November 1994. After several reviews, the action plan was approved. The FAA funded initial
work in February 1995 and plans to fund to completion in FY 1996. This program consists of
the following four major elements:
(l) An increase in effort to cover the growth in the number of reports submitted and to expand
the number of "call back" validations conducted.
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(2)A modernizationprogramto improvetheperformanceof thecomputersystemssupporting
datainput andanalysis.Theevaluationof artificial-intelligencetechniquesto providescreening
andsamplingaswell astheuseof statisticaltechniques(Thesetechniques houldsubstantially
reducethework requiredto performtheanalysisfor input). A modernizationprogramis expect-
ed to yield electronicdistributionof derivativedatain theform of CD/ROMandInternetdistrib-
ution.
(3) Initiation of aneducationalandpromotionalprogramdirectedat membersof the industrial
community,aswell astheFAA analystswhoseworkcanbeenhancedby accessto thesedata.
Theeffort will includetheelectronicdistributionof
ASRSproductsincludingCALLBACK andDIRECTLINE.
(4) Theexpansionof theASRSto solicit inputfrom a widerrangeof theflight community,
includingcabinattendants,mechanics,andtechnicians.
NASA is alreadyconductingactivity to improvetheASRSincludingtheissuesraisedby the
findingsandrecommendationsidentifiedby theASAR
Finding #33:
For many years, NACA and NASA aeronautical research and flight safety benefitted from the
advise and counsel provided by an advisory group of aircraft operations specialists consisting of
representatives from civil and military aviation and manufacturers of aircraft, engines, and acces-
sories as well as NACA/NASA personnel.
Recommendation #33:
NASA should restore the previous capacity to capture the operational experience it found useful
in improving its research focus and flight safety.
NASA Response to Recommendation #33:
The Office of Aeronautics, in consultation with DFRC and others, will assess potential changes
to the current Aeronautics Advisory Committee's subcommittee structure that would provide
improved advice and council on aircraft safety and operating problems.
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APPENDIX C
NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL ACTIVITIES
FEBRUARY-DECEMBER 1995
FEBRUARY
1-3 STS-63 Mission Meetings and Launch, Kennedy Space Center
7-8 Space Shuttle Mir Briefing, Johnson Space Center
MARCH
15-17 Processing Operations Review, Kennedy Space Center
16 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, House of Representatives' hearing on
"The Outside Opinion: NASA Restructuring Space Shuttle/
Space Station Reusable Launch Vehicles", Washington, DC
22 Panel Plenary Session, NASA Headquarters
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APRIL
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Meeting, NASA Headquarters
11 Letter to Chairman Sensenbrenner responding to followup questions
from March 16 hearing
12 Space Shuttle Program Discussions with General Accounting Office,
NASA Headquarters
19-20 Review of Aeronautics and Human Factors Safety Programs, Ames
Research Center
MAY
Space Shuttle Downsizing Review, NASA Headquarters
9-11 Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel Meeting, Lewis Research Center
15 Letter Report to Administrator on Panel Review of Space Shuttle
Management Independent Review, NASA Federal Laboratory Review,
and Zero Base Review
16 Testimony before Subcommittee on Science and Technology and Space,
US Senate's hearing on "Space Shuttle and Reusable Launch Vehicle
Programs"
24-25 Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine and Center Safety Programs,
Marshall Space Flight Center
C-1
JUNE
2
13
14-15
21-23
28
JULY
10
11-12
13
19-20
19
26
AUGUST
3-4
9
10
31
SEPTEMBER
22
27
STS-71 Flight Readiness Review, Kennedy Space Center
Review of Redesign Solid Rocket Motor Program, Thiokol Corporation
Review of the External Tank Activities, Michoud Assembly Facility
STS-71 Mission Meetings and Launch, Kennedy Space Center
Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine Turbopump Nozzle Cracks, Rocketdyne
Space Shuttle Main Engine Turbopump Nozzle Cracks Interview, Dallas
Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine Turbopump Program, Rocketdyne
Review of Aeronautics Safety Programs, Langley Research Center
Review of Space Shuttle and International Space Station Safety Programs,
Johnson Space Center
Panel Plenary Session, Johnson Space Center
Review Meeting of GAO Report on Space Shuttle in Support of Space
Station, NASA Headquarters
Software Review, Johnson Space Center
Interview on Yellow Creek's Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program,
NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Restructuring Meeting, NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Main Engine High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Assessment
Team Report to the NASA Administrator
Review of Space Shuttle Safety Operations in preparation of September 27
Testimony, Kennedy Space Center
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, House of Representatives' hearing on
"The Space Shuttle Program in Transition: Keeping Safety Paramount"
C-2
OCTOBER
16
17
18
18
19
19
24
NOVEMBER
1-2
28-29
28
29
29
DECEMBER
14
Panel Plenary Session, Lancaster, CA
Review of Aerospace Projects, Dryden Flight Research Center
Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine Blocks I and II Programs,
Rocketdyne
Review of Space Station Electric Power System, Rocketdyne
Review of Space Shuttle Orbiter Program, Rockwell
Review of the Information Technology and Software, Ames Research Center
Letter to Chairman Sensenbrenner responding to folloup questions from
September 27 hearing on "The Space Shuttle Program in Transition:
Keeping Safety Paramount"
Integrated Logistics Panel Meeting, Kennedy Space Center
Panel Plenary Session, NASA Headquarters
Review of Safety and Mission Assurance Restructuring, NASA
Headquarters
Review of Space Station Security Concerns, NASA Headquarters
Review of Space Shuttle Restructuring, NASA Headquarters
Review of Space Shuttle Restructuring and Privatization,
NASA Headquarters
C-3


National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
For Further Information Please Contact:
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
NASA Headquarters
